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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the utilization of private military companies (PMCs) by government 
agencies of the United States in contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The aim 
of this thesis is to investigate the roles that PMCs play in current contingency operations, 
and to analyze how PMCs can become more useful instruments in contingency operations 
if they are properly outsourced, managed, supervised, and regulated. In this regard, this 
study largely rests on transaction cost economics to explain the logic of outsourcing from 
governmental agencies’ perspectives. On the other hand, principal-agent theory and new 
institutionalism provide the theoretical basis of using effective oversight mechanisms to 
exert better control over the activities of PMCs in contingency operations. This thesis 
recommends the United States, Iraq, and Afghanistan use the Montreux Document as a 
guide to better regulate PMCs in contingency operations. 
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A. DEFINITION OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES (PMC) 
Some scholars define private security as any activity that is undertaken by a 
company to protect a “noun,” that is, an individual, a place, or a thing.1 Many others 
make a broader definition that covers some other key services such as presenting 
intelligence analysis, operational coordination, and training of security forces or law 
enforcement personnel.2 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 
(P.L. 110-181 Sec. 864) describes private security as functions associated with protecting 
individuals, facilities, or properties, and any other activity for which contractors are 
obliged to carry weapons. However, such a definition excludes unarmed personnel who 
are performing functions directly related to security.3  
International law is rife with conventions that define mercenarism; nevertheless, 
written documents that clearly seek to define private military companies (PMCs) are 
scarce. The Geneva Conventions, which are the only globally accepted documents that 
establish norms for humanitarian treatment of victims of war in times of armed conflicts, 
define the term “mercenary,” which had historically played a significant role in warfare; 
however, do not define the term “private military company,” which is a relatively new 
phenomenon for international law. Although Article 47 of the Geneva Convention 
“deprives mercenaries of the privilege to serve as lawful combatants and the immunity to 
be treated as prisoners of war upon capture,”4 there remains confusion about whether 
                                                 
1 Moshe Schwartz, “The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and 




4 Todd S. Milliard, “Overcoming Post Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognize and Regulate Private 
Military Companies,” Master’s Thesis, 2003, 41. 
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PMCs represent “a new form of mercenary activity”5 or not. The United Nations 
International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use Financing and Training of 
Mercenaries, and The Convention for Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa also define 
mercenarism, even though these definitions are by and large reproductions of the 
definition that was made by the Geneva Conventions. Although both documents prohibit 
mercenarism, there still remain challenges regarding enforcement of existing regulations. 
The Montreux Document, which was signed in 2009 by seventeen countries including the 
United States, Afghanistan, and Iraq, is currently the most comprehensive effort to define 
PMCs. It is not a binding, but an advisory document that promotes best practices 
regarding utilization of PMCs by States. According to the Montreux Document; PMCs 
are;  
private business entities that provide military and/or security services, 
irrespective of how they describe themselves. Military and security 
services include, in particular, armed guarding and protection of persons 
and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places; maintenance and 
operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or 
training of local forces and security personnel.6  
PMCs perform a wide variety of functions in different states and on behalf of 
different entities. However, in this thesis, PMCs are conceptualized as alternative service 
providers, which are contracted out by the United States governmental agencies to 
perform various functions on behalf of the United States government in contingency 
operations in Iraq and in Afghanistan. In this regard, any private firm that executes at 
least one of the tasks that are mentioned above will be considered a PMC. Therefore, the 
definition that the Montreux Document presents will provide the basis of this thesis. 
                                                 
5 Sabelo Gumedze, “Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa: A Need For a New Continental 
Approach,” ISS Monograph Series, No.147, July 2008, 21. Also see the report by United Nations Working 
Group on Use of Mercenaries, at: 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/0/F8B77250C05361F3C125731A004B0E6D?opendocument 
(accessed August 11, 2010). 
6 See Montreux Document, 9, at: http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/montreux-
document-170908/$FILE/ICRC_002_0996.pdf (accessed July 19, 2010). 
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B. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MILITARIES AND PMCS  
According to Max Weber, a state has “the monopoly on the legitimate use of 
physical force” within its own territory.7 A state monopolizes the use of force by 
delegating some of its authority to the military, which has been considered by some 
scholars to be the only legitimate tool of a state authorized to use force if necessary. 
When PMCs emerged as alternative security providers, particularly after the end of the 
Cold War, scholars began to debate whether outsourcing security is appropriate, cost-
efficient and useful, or not.8  
Both militaries, which are public agencies, and PMCs, which are private 
corporations, are security providers; however, there are striking differences between 
them. The first difference is that unlike militaries, private military is not considered to be 
a profession. Samuel Huntington defines professionalism by means of three primary 
characteristics: expertise, social responsibility, and corporateness.9 He conceptualizes the 
military as a profession, only if its officer corps has internalized all of these 
characteristics. According to Huntington, what separates an officer from a mercenary is 
that while for an officer, social responsibility outweighs monetary motivation; for a 
mercenary, private gain is the primary motivation. When the criteria that Huntington uses 
to measure professionalism are applied to PMCs, it becomes clear that private security is 
not a profession for two prominent reasons: first; money, most of the time even if not 
always, outweighs social responsibility in the private military sector. Second; unlike 
militaries, PMCs lack of corporateness. PMCs are private entities that have distinct 
organizational cultures and norms. Expertise, on the other hand, is perhaps the most  
 
 
                                                 
7 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in O’Neil and Rogowski, eds., Essential Readings of 
Comparative Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006), 23. Also see Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott 
D. Tollefson, eds., Who Guards the Guardians and How (Texas: University of Texas Press, 2006), 18. 
8 Peter Warren Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2003), 49. Also see Deborah Avant,The Market for Force: The Consequences of 
Privatizing Security (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1–5. 
9 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(London: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 1985), 8. 
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important reason that principals prefer PMCs, as they provide some services that require 
considerable proficiency. Nevertheless, though necessary, expertise is not sufficient alone 
to make private military a profession. 
The second difference is that militaries are responsible to both the state and the 
society, whereas PMCs are only responsible to their principals in terms of their contracts. 
As Martha Minow states, “Military training, unit discipline, the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, and international legal standards governing war and armed conflicts 
ensure accountability for the military but not for private corporations and their employees 
engaged in military work.”10 According to Peter Warren Singer:  
Private employees have distinctly different motivations, responsibilities, 
and loyalties than those in the public military. No matter their background, 
while in a private company, employees are directly responsible to the 
corporation and its executives; they are hired, fired, promoted, demoted, 
rewarded, and disciplined by the management of their private company, 
not by government officials or the public.11  
There are many regulations and laws that keep militaries accountable at both 
national and international levels. However, there is neither overarching international 
regulatory framework nor effective regulatory mechanisms at the national level that keep 
PMCs accountable, including the Geneva Conventions. Moreover, even though some 
countries have written laws and regulations that seek to exert control over PMCs, 
enforcement still remains a challenge. Despite the patches to existing gaps in regulations, 
some PMC personnel still fall outside of the national and international regulatory 
framework. In other words, PMCs in a sense operate in the grey area.12  
Last but not least; while for militaries there is only one legitimate principal (state), 
for PMCs, there are many options, including: states, international organizations, such as 
                                                 
10 Martha Minow, “Outsourcing Power: Privatizing Military Efforts and the Risks to Accountability, 
Professionalism, and Democracy,” in Jody Freeman and Martha Minow, eds., Government by Contract 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 115. 
11 Singer, Corporate Warriors: the Rise of Privatized Military Industry, 154. 
12 Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini, “Privatizing Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private 
Military and Security Companies,” paper (Occasional Paper No: 6) presented as part of the policy 
dialogue on issues pertaining to the core mission of Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed 
Forces (DCAF) in Geneva, March 2005, 57. 
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the UN, regional organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private 
corporations, and weak governments. Picking and choosing between multiple principles 
brings about many potential hazards on the part of the governments that employ them, 
while providing PMCs with considerable flexibilities. Unlike militaries, PMCs have the 
opportunity to select between these alternatives, and to switch sides, depending on who 
pays the most. Integrity and probity, which are important components of the military 
profession, do not make sense in the private military sector.  
C. CLASSIFICATION OF PMCS 
According to Moshe Shwartz, functions performed by PMCs may basically be 
classified into two major types: armed services and unarmed services. Armed services 
include static security, convoy security, security escorts and personal security, whereas 
unarmed services encompass operational coordination, intelligence analysis, hostage 
negotiations, and security training.13 However, this classification is so general that we 
cannot comprehend the capabilities of the individual firms that constitute the industry. 
The United Kingdom “Green Paper” classifies the PMCs according to the services 
they provide: a) combat and operational support; b) military advice and training; c) arms 
procurement; d) intelligence gathering; e) security and crime investigation; and f) 
logistical support.14 This categorization points to specialization in the Private Military 
Industry; however, data shows that even though specialization is an essential 
characteristic in the industry, some PMCs provide more than one service at a time and do 
not fit perfectly on this scale. 
Doug Brooks provides a simpler classification, naming the industry as Military 
Service Providers (MSP) and dividing it into three main types: a) Nonlethal Service 
                                                 
13 Schwartz, “The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and 
Afghanistan: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress,” 2. 
14 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “HC 577 Private Military Companies: Options for 
Regulation,” A report by London Stationary Office, February 12, 2002, 10. 
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Providers (NSPs); b) Private Security Companies (PSC); and c) Private Military 
Companies (PMC).15 Then Brooks divides these main categories into subcategories.16 
Peter Singer replaces the term PMCs with “Private Military Firms” (PMFs).17 He 
believes that PMFs are organized to supply one of three basic functions: direct military 
support, advisory and training, or non-lethal aid and assistance. He uses the “tip of the 
spear” tool to place three types of PMFs along the range of three main military functions. 
He classifies PMFs as military provider firms, military consulting firms, and military 
support firms. According to Singer, military provider firms offer direct tactical military 
assistance to clients. Executive Outcomes (EO) is one of the prominent examples of 
military provider firms. Military consulting firms, on the other hand, provide “high-
quality tactical, operational and strategic advice for the structuring, training, equipping 
and employment of armed forces.”18 They largely draw on retired senior and non-
commissioned officers.19 For example, Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI), 
which provides military advice and training, and which is famous for its success in 
turning the Croat militia into a NATO-style army during “Operation Storm” in 1995, is 
one of the leading military consulting firms in the United States. Lastly, military support 
firms provide “logistics, intelligence, and maintenance services to armed forces.”20 
Halliburton and Kellogg, and Brown and Root, are examples of military support firms. 
Deborah Avant argues that many private firms today offer distinct military 
functions simultaneously, and may appear in more than one specific region on the spear 
at a particular time; therefore, she argues, it is not useful to classify them according to 
their support type. She provides a different classification based on the contracts, rather 
                                                 
15 Doug Brooks, “Protecting People: the PMC Potential,” a working document presented as 
Comments and Suggestions for the UK Green Paper on Regulating Private Military Services, July 25, 
2002, 2, at: http://www.hoosier84.com/0725brookspmcregs.pdf  (accessed June 26, 2010). 
16 Doug Brooks, “Protecting People: the PMC Potential,” 2. 
17 Singer, Corporate Warriors: the Rise of Privatized Military Industry, 88–100. 
18 Steven Brayton, "Outsourcing War: Mercenaries and the Privatization of Peacekeeping,” Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol. 55, No. 2 (Spring 2002), 307. 
19 Peter Warren Singer, “Private Military Industry and Iraq: What Have We Learned and Where to 
Next,” Policy Paper for DCAF (November 2004), 3. 
20 Ibid. 
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than the firms.21 Like Singer, she uses the “tip of the spear” tool to categorize contracts. 
She breaks down the services into two parts: police and military functions. While she 
classifies military functions as “armed operational support, unarmed operational support 
on the battlefield, unarmed military advice and training, and logistical support,” she 
categorizes police functions as “armed site security, unarmed site security, police advice 
and training, crime prevention and intelligence.”22 
Nicholas Dew and Bryan Hudgens revise both Avant’s and Singer’s “tip of the 
spear” diagrams, and set forth a more comprehensive “tip of the spear” to represent the 
capabilities of the individual firms in the industry. They analyzed as many as 2,500 
individual capabilities that various firms have in the private military sector that they think 
“is made up of quite different sub-sectors, which are probably better thought as a 
patchwork quilt than as elements up and down the spear.”23 They classify primary 
capabilities of PMFs into three categories: operational capabilities, which include attack 
operations and protection services; advisory and training capabilities; and support service 
capabilities, which encompass different sub-categories ranging from tactical equipment 
maintenance and operation to admin services.24 
For the purpose of this thesis, we will use the classification of PMFs that Dew and 
Hudgens presented; however, we will call them PMCs, rather than PMFs. “The tip of the 
spear” that they provided is not only comprehensive enough to demonstrate the 
capabilities of the individual firms, but also simple enough to grasp the basic functions 
that the sector is able to supply.  
D. BRIEF HISTORY OF PMCS 
Private security dates back to the beginning of civilizations. In the past, soldiers 
for hire have been called many names: soldiers of fortune, condotierri, free companies, 
freelancers, “Julius Caesar”, and “dogs of war.” Mercenaries, however, have begun to 
                                                 
21 Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security, 17. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Nicholas Dew and Bryan Hudgens, “Evolving Private Military Sector: A Survey,” Acquisition 
Research Sponsored Report Series NPS-AM-08-012, August 11, 2008, 17. 
24 Ibid., 18. 
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gain prominence since the formation of modern nation states. Therefore, the time frame, 
which begins with the modern nation state and continues to the present time, is 
particularly important in terms of evolution of PMCs.  
In a sense, the most significant factor that caused the formation of modern nation 
states was the cost of war. In an anarchic international system, a sufficient amount of 
capital and a large population were so critical that without them it was too difficult for 
any state to provide its citizens with security and to survive as a sovereign entity. States 
had no choice but to establish institutions such as taxation systems and conscription, in 
order to supply financial and human capital, which are required to afford their costly 
wars. To serve this purpose, a social contract has been established between the citizen 
and the modern nation state.25 According to this contract, citizens would demand security 
from the state in return for paying regular taxes and serving as soldiers in the army when 
the state was at war. Whether a nation would be able to survive as a sovereign entity in 
the international system or not, by and large, would depend on its capability to 
“monopolize the use of force” 26 through raising soldiers, maintaining national armies, 
and using them to achieve their political goals. However, there were also states with 
insufficient population to maintain an army, but having the financial means to hire one, 
and predictably they have outsourced these military capabilities to materialize their 
political objectives. For example; on the brink of the French Revolutionary wars, half of 
the Prussian army consisted of soldiers from abroad who were fighting for money.27 The 
best troops that Napoleon used against Russia were Italian mercenaries.28 By the end of 
the Napoleonic Wars, Britain was by far the most highly taxed country in Europe.29 
Taxes collected in Britain at that time were roughly twice as much as those collected in 
France. 30 
                                                 
25 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, in P.D. Jimack, ed., The Social Contract and 
Discourses (Rutland, Vt: Charles E. Tuttle,1993), 203. 
26 Weber, "Politics as a Vocation,” 23. 





Traditionally, mercenaries have played important roles in warfare in the United 
States. For instance; some notable American heroes, like Friedrich Wilhelm Augustus 
von Steuben and Tadeusz Kosciuszko, were in fact foreign officers hired to organize, 
train and lead the Continental Army.31 During the American Civil War (1861-1865) 
Washington hired private companies to get strategic intelligence.32 For example; 
Pinkerton, which was one of the prominent private detective companies, had been hired 
to spy on the South.33 During both World War I and World War II, the U.S. has 
outsourced private companies. In World War II, the government of China contracted with 
American fighter pilots, who were also known as the Flying Tigers to fight the 
Japanese.34 The Kellogg Company, which is the predecessor of current engineering and 
construction companies, has been one of the biggest contractors that supply services for 
the U.S. Agencies since WWII. Kellogg Company participated in the Manhattan Project, 
which brought the first atomic bombs into existence.35 Brown and Root constructed naval 
stations and ships for the U.S. Navy.36 Kellogg Brown & Root Company (KBR) was the 
prominent private company that took the lead in construction projects during the Vietnam 
War.37 During the Gulf War, the U.S. outsourced numerous logistical and basic security 
functions to private companies.  
E. THE RISE OF THE PRIVATE MILITARY INDUSTRY 
Nicholas Dew and Bryan Hudgens state that what has given rise to a boom in the 
sector has two dimensions: the impact of the evolution of demand-side factors, and the 
influences of the evolution of supply-side factors.38 They note that the prominent demand  
                                                 
31 Jay James Carafano, Private Sector, Public Wars: Contractors in Combat, Afghanistan, Iraq and 
Future conflicts (Westport USA: Praeger Security International, 2008), 25. 
32 Ibid., 26. 
33 Carafano, Private Sector, Public Wars: Contractors in Combat, Afghanistan, Iraq and Future 
conflicts, 26. 
34 Isenberg, “Private Military Contractors and U.S. Grand Strategy,” 19. 




38 Dew and Hudgens, “Evolving Private Military Sector: A Survey,” 43. 
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factors that have led to a boom in the industry are failing states, rising wealth, natural 
resource dependencies, and normative policy paradigms.39 They emphasize that failing 
states are  
precisely the places where governments cannot guarantee the security of 
individuals; hence, individuals have to make their own security 
arrangements. NGOs, international organizations, extractive industries and 
some western government agencies are driven to do work in these 
countries for a variety of reasons and, when they get there, they have to at 
least supplement local security arrangements in order to bring security up 
to standards their employees find acceptable.40  
They highlight that the United States has a large share in the industry (53 
percent)41 and it was with the global war on terrorism that the sector began to do more of 
their business with the public sector.42 As widely known, private military industry entails 
wide spectrum of sub-sectors such as logistics outsourcing, operation and maintenance 
support for tactical equipment, Explosive Ordnance Disposal/De-mining and other sub-
sectors including training, advisory, engineering and construction, IT/IS security services, 
intelligence services, base operations, and medical services. They note that on the supply 
side, each individual sub-sector operating in the private military industry has its own 
evolutionary trajectories.43 No question that technology has played a key role in shaping 
these sub-sectors. As Dew and Hudgens observe, “… the rapid pace of recent changes in 
technology has probably had quite a different effect on surveillance and information 
gathering than it has had on advisory activities.”44  
Peter Warren Singer states that the rise of the private military industry is a global 
phenomenon. He asserts that from a global perspective, the boom in the industry is by 
and large associated with the end of the Cold War.45 The end of the Cold War had three 
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significant impacts on private military industry. First, it gave states a reason to downsize 
their militaries.46 However, this trend simultaneously rendered millions of ex-military 
personnel unemployed. In 1987, there were approximately 28,320,000 soldiers in the 
world.47 By 2000, this number had already shrunk to 22,500,000, leaving some 6 million 
soldiers unemployed over a decade.48 This army of unemployed soldiers created a 
demand in the market, triggering the supply side to establish formal business entities that 
provide goods and services very similar to that of militaries. Second, by the end of the 
cold war, a large number of arms stock in a wide variety including guns, tanks, and 
fighter jets, became available on the open market, facilitating the acquisition of required 
arms, vehicles, and other military means and tools by PMCs.49 Third, the end of the Cold 
War indirectly reignited ethnic, religious and political conflicts in the Third World, 
formerly held in check by superpowers.50 In turn, PMCs not only have turned out to be 
attractive job providers for unemployed soldiers, but also have undertaken significant 
tasks to manage conflicts in the Third World. In some cases, as in Angola and Sierra 
Leone, PMCs performed some tasks very similar to that of UN peacekeeping forces.51 
F. THE UNITED STATES’ USE OF PMCS IN CONTINGENCY 
OPERATIONS 
From the U.S. perspective, what has given rise to the industry, particularly after 
2001, is an emerging void, which stems from the mismatch between the geopolitical 
objectives of the U.S. and the resources provided by the public.52 As Bruneau argues, 
“Overall U.S. Army forces, for example, were reduced 32% from 732,000 in 1990 to 
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499,301 by 2003.”53 Despite this trend, the United States has defined itself as the 
guarantor of global stability in the new world order; however, the U.S. public has 
apparently been reluctant to back this grand strategy.54 In this regard, it can be said that 
PMCs have played a key role in matching these objectives and tools. That the United 
States has increased its reliance on contractors particularly after the end of the Cold War 
can clearly be seen in Table 1. 
Presence of Contractor Personnel During U.S. Military Operations 
 Estimated Personnel (Thousands) 
Conflict Contractor Military 
Estimated Ration of 
Contractor to Military 
Personnel 
Revolutionary War 2 9 1 to 6 
War of 1812 n.a. 38 n.a. 
Mexican-American War 6 33 1 to 6 
Civil war 200 1000 1 to 5 
Spanish-American War n.a 35 n.a 
World War I 85 2000 1 to 24 
World war II 734 5400 1 to 7 
Korea 156 393 1 to 2.5 
Vietnam 70 359 1 to 5 
 The End of the Cold 
War 
Gulf War 9 500 1 to 55 
Balkans 20 20 1 to 1 
Iraq Theater as of early 
2008 
190 200 1 to 1 
Table 1.   Presence of Contractor Personnel during U.S. Military Operations  
(After Congressional Budget Office, Contractors’ Support of U.S. Military 
Operations in Iraq)  
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54 Ibid., 5. 
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During the first ten years of the post-Cold War period, the Clinton administration, 
and especially Vice President Al Gore, believed that handing over some security work 
from government employees to contractors would increase productivity while reducing 
costs. According to a 1995 Defense Science Board report, the Pentagon should outsource 
all support functions except major combat missions to save up to $12 billion yearly.55  
Although the rise of the sector is in fact a post-Cold War phenomenon, 9/11 also 
had a great impact on the number of contractors hired to accompany military forces. In 
2002, the U.S. military was drafting a new framework to put “the third wave plan” into 
practice by gradually increasing its long-run dependence on private military contractors. 
This plan had three main objectives: first, to release the military work force and its 
capabilities for the global war on terrorism; second, to enable commanders to concentrate 
on winning the war by outsourcing other supplementary functions; and third, to support 
the President’s Management Agenda.56 During the Bush administration, reliance on 
PMCs increased significantly due largely to Global War on Terrorism strategy. Thus, 
PMCs have turned out to be an indispensible part of the contingency operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. 
The Transparency and Accountability in Military and Security Contracting Act 
(S. 674), which was introduced by Senator Obama in February 2007 as an amendment to 
the 2008 Defense Authorization Act that was then referred to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee but never passed into law, frames the responsibilities of federal agencies that 
inform Congress about the numbers of PMC personnel employed, killed, and wounded, 
and disciplinary actions taken against them.57  
In February 2009, the Obama administration brought in a number of changes and 
improvements associated with reducing state expenditures on the outsourcing of some 
critical services, such as military security and intelligence, and increasing the role of full-
time government workers in such areas.58 The Obama administration also promised to 
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improve the quality of the government staff that are overseeing and auditing contracting 
processes.59 Moreover, Obama's 2010 budget notes, “The administration also will clarify 
what is inherently a governmental function and what is a commercial one; critical 
government functions will not be performed by the private sector for purely ideological 
reasons.”60  
G. RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH RELIANCE ON PMCS 
In his book, Private Sector, Public Wars, Jay James Carafano emphasizes the 
increasing U.S. reliance on contractors by these words:  
In Vietnam, for every one hundred soldiers one contractor was employed. 
During the Gulf War (1991), one contractor was on the battlefield for 
every fifty soldiers. During OIF, contractors made up on out of every ten 
personnel. Only six years later, one contractor supported government 
operations in Iraq for about every 1.5 soldiers.61  
There are many reasons that the United States relies on PMCs in contingency 
operations. For instance, PMCs can be quickly mobilized and demobilized, and they may 
free up military personnel to focus on offensive combat operations.62 However, reliance 
on PMCs runs the risk of undermining the integrity and the effectiveness of the military 
for three prominent reasons: First, PMCs appropriate the human capital of militaries by 
offering readily trained officer corps higher salaries.63 Second, advanced technology and 
expertise that PMCs provide keep militaries from generating their own capacities 
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internally.64 Third, PMCs weakens the integrity and the effectiveness of the military by 
employing subcontractors that the military would not normally wish to work with.65  
To begin with, PMCs and militaries are in a sense rivals, since they both rely on 
the same human capital that performs close missions. PMCs usually specialize in a 
particular area. They employ personnel who have considerable expertise and experience 
in that area. Most of these personnel are former soldiers, who were previously trained in 
militaries. PMCs generally offer attractive salaries to the talented officers, who retire to 
begin a new career. The better-paying alternative sometimes appeals to these officers, 
motivating them to retire from the military earlier than they had planned. In turn, they 
leave the military in order to earn much more money in the private sector.  
Broadly speaking, reliance on PMCs for advanced technology, and sophisticated 
weapon and logistics systems prevents militaries from developing their own capacities. 
This weakens the military strength, leaving them vulnerable to risks related to 
sustainability, maintenance, and control. Asymmetrically established contracts, which 
provide a highly specific asset under a highly unpredictable environment where 
management and oversight becomes difficult for the principal, are likely to put the 
principal into a disadvantageous position. It is likely that a PMC, which has a logistical 
contract with DoD, may reject to escort a logistical convoy, compensating for the 
extraordinary risks about the mission. It is also likely that compensating for failing to pay 
for its subcontractors, This PMC may leave the troops on the ground without food and 
other critical supplies, such as batteries and oil. In sum, PMCs may put the mission and 
the troops in danger, and thus undermine the integrity and effectiveness of the military.  
In addition to all the foregoing, governments may lose control over their activities 
“under the layers of contracting and subcontracting.”66 From government’s perspective, 
reliance on PMCs runs the risk of indirectly employing personnel who would normally 
not be employed, because PMCs are not restricted to employing subcontractors. For 
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example, particularly during the Bush administration, the U.S. Congress limited the 
number of contractors employed by the government; however, did not put any restrictions 
on the number of subcontractors. On the part of governmental agencies, this policy led to 
the prevalent implication of contracting with a major PMC for the provision of a huge 
service, and leaving the accomplishment of the service at the mercy of smaller one-shot 
PMCs, which are subcontracted by the major PMC. This policy has also enabled 
politicians to conceal the actual size of the government from the public.67 Inadvertently, 
this policy has contributed to various institutional inefficiencies. Not knowing how 
largely they rely on PMCs, agencies miscalculated many aspects of contingency needs. 
Predictably, the results have often been fraud and waste. On the other hand, bearing 
financial concerns, major PMCs mostly subcontracted smaller PMCs that poorly 
performed their tasks. The subcontractors have generally been either third-country 
nationals, or locals, who demanded lower salaries. They were cheap; however, they were 
not trained as well as home-country nationals, which at least had military experience. 
Thus, subcontracting had many negative impacts on governmental agencies. Due to 
subcontracting, governmental agencies have not only lost control over PMCs, but also 
unintentionally turned out to be less efficient organizations.  
H. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Scholars, who are studying PMCs, can be divided into two major camps in terms 
of the type of their studies. Academicians and political scientists, such as Peter Warren 
Singer, Deborah Avant, Fred Schreier, Marina Caparini, Thomas Bruneau, David 
Isenberg, Jennifer K. Elsea, Mosche Shwartz, Doug Brooks, Simons Chesterman, Chia 
Lehnardt, Allison Stanger, Benedict Sheehy, Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, Virginia 
Newell, and James Stephenson constitute the academic camp, whereas authors who are 
mostly of a journalistic origin, for instance Thomas E. Ricks, Robert Young Pelton 
(author and filmmaker), Jeremy Scahill (journalist), James Ascroft, Tim Spicer, Tim 
Shorrock (author, commentator and journalist), and Steve Fainaru (correspondent and 
journalist), comprise the non-academic or journalistic group.  
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On the other hand, it is possible to classify scholars from these two camps as 
opponents, proponents, and impartials. Impartials are mostly the academicians that write 
books and articles for academic circles, and prepare reports and make assessments for 
various state agencies and institutions. They approach PMCs in a more objective manner 
than opponents and proponents. They do not overemphasize either the pros or the cons of 
PMCs. They accept the reality of private military industry in modern warfare, but also try 
to focus on how to establish effective structural mechanisms to prevent their negative 
impacts.  
Proponents believe that unless the demand that gave rise to them diminishes, 
reliance on PMCs will persist. According to them, “They (PMCs) are on America’s 
battlefields because the government, reflecting the will of the people, wants them 
there.”68 Some see PMCs and outsourcing as a trend. Some others claim that it is not a 
choice but a compulsory decision to outsource some military functions to PMCs. For 
instance, Department of Defense (DoD) officials state that the post-Cold War budget cuts 
required significant logistical personnel reductions in the U.S. military and brought about 
a consequential increase in contractors providing logistical support.69 These scholars 
believe that Private Security Companies are hired when conventional forces are 
inadequate to the mission assigned.70 They emphasize that PMCs are not doing anything 
on their own, but performing the tasks the officials assign to them. According to them, 
PMCs are not mercenaries. Furthermore, proponents usually highlight the advantages of 
PMCs. For instance, they often claim that they are cheaper and cost-efficient.71 They 
believe that PMCs are particularly good at specific tasks, as well as less sensitive to 
casualties and able to be deployed much more quickly than the national armies.72 Most of 
these scholars often indicate the successes of the EOs, a PMC that closed itself 
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immediately after the South African Law prohibited its nationals from working as 
mercenaries,73 which is praised for its achievements in managing the conflicts in Angola 
and Sierra Leone in the 1990s.  
Opponents by and large make assessments from an ethical perspective. Their 
negative perspective of PMCs is largely because: “wars had a tendency to make people in 
the private sector rich.”74 Opponents usually promote their negative impacts and 
disadvantages. Most of them set forth an ethical argument to support their claims. 
Opponents believe that “the monopoly on the use of force” 75 should only belong to the 
state itself, so they think that PMCs eradicate state legitimacy. They generally assert that 
PMCs are unreliable since they are primarily money-oriented.76 For the same reason, 
they see PMCs as unethical entities77 and view them as mercenaries. Opponents also 
claim that “PMCs perform in the grey area of international law,”78 so they believe that 
for a contractor, it is relatively easier to abuse international laws in wartime, since they 
know that even if they conduct a crime, the gaps in the law will protect them. These 
scholars state that PMCs are not always as cheap as believed, since the indirect and the 
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main reason that EO seemed more successful than national armies in Angola and Sierra 
Leone was that unlike the UN, EO was not neutral, since it took the government’s side in 
both cases.80  
While opponents state that PMCs undermine the efforts of the United States in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, proponents note that PMCs’ day-to-day actions, which have a 
tactical nature, have nothing to do with damaging strategic objectives of the United 
States.81 Furthermore, CEOs of PMCs claim that reputation is so important in the private 
security industry that a good image in the public eye guarantees successive contracts, 
whereas a bad image can completely annihilate their businesses. David Isenberg, who is 
one of the prominent researchers in that area and also the author of Shadow Force: 
Private Security Contractors in Iraq, states that “the low visibility and presumed low cost 
of private contractors appeals to those who favor a global U.S. military presence, but fear 
that such a strategy cannot command public support.”82 He believes that “by using 
contractors, the U.S. also shift responsibility and blame for its actions.”83 From the U.S. 
government’s perspective, utilization of PMCs as a part of strategy is the natural 
outgrowth of the government’s recent efforts to keep pace with changing demands of the 
operational environment by “rebalancing between the roles of private sector and the 
public sector play in war.”84  
Nihat Dumlupinar recently wrote a Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Master’s 
thesis about the regulation of PMCs in Iraq. In his thesis, he examines the basic problems 
of utilizing PMCs in contingency operations in terms of two types of states: strong states, 
and weak states.85 As he argues “…the incentives of strong states are related to 
effectiveness and efficiency and political reasons. In contrast, in most cases, PMCs are 
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the only option for weak states in order to survive, because they do not have sufficient 
public forces and it is not easy to obtain rapid foreign assistance due to political 
reasons.”86 He claims that weak states have no control over activities of PMCs in their 
own territories.87 Furthermore, he set forth that the extensive use of PMCs has 
undermined U.S. efforts in Iraq.88 In this context, he uses “the principal agent theory” 
and “new institutionalism” to explain the regulation problems regarding PMCs.89 
According to Dumlupinar: “The control dimension is the only subject of old theories. 
Effectiveness and efficiency, which are presented as new dimensions of civil-military 
relations by Bruneau and Matei, are not the subject of old theories.”90 He notes that the 
challenges in regulation are largely associated with the weaknesses of current national 
and international institutions.91 As a practical solution, he recommends that a registration 
and a licensing system might be useful instruments for regulation in the national level.92 
He also draws attention to the necessity of an international institution that can operate as 
a registering entity at the international level.93 Moreover, he emphasizes the relevance of 
a new international law to encompass PMCs.94 Finally, he highlights that provider states 
must have the ultimate responsibility for the illegal actions of their PMCs.95  
I. RESEARCH QUESTION 
1. Importance 
Utilizing PMCs to provide security and some logistics functions in support of 
stabilization and reconstruction efforts has increasingly become a noteworthy issue in the 
                                                 
86 Nihat Dumlupinar, “Regulation of Private Military Companies in Iraq,” NPS Thesis, March 2010, 
89. 
87 Ibid., 90. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid., 23–27. 
90 Ibid., 89. 
91 Ibid. 





United States and in many other nations and organizations, including the United 
Nations.96 As of September 2009, there were more contractors than American troops in 
Afghanistan, at a ratio of 1.63 to 1.97 PMCs have participated in almost all of the 
peacekeeping operations conducted by the United Nations between 1990 and 2005.98 
This growing reliance on PMCs worldwide has encouraged the private military industry 
to expand its area of interests, employing large numbers of personnel, and diversifying its 
services in many areas. Today, the United States is increasingly relying on PMCs to 
perform a wide variety of tasks and services, such as: protecting individuals; transporting 
convoys; securing forward operation bases, edifices, and other critical economic 
infrastructure; supplying food and laundry services; and training the local security forces 
in Iraq and Afghanistan.99 Considering the insufficiency of the U.S. troops in both 
countries, PMCs, which can be seen as “force multipliers”100 for the U.S. military efforts, 
are playing vital roles in terms of Iraq’s and Afghanistan’s stabilization and 
reconstruction processes. According to U.S. government officials, both the Department of 
State and the Department of Defense could not do without PMCs in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan.101   
2. Research Question 
Since the Obama administration is planning to complete the withdrawal of U.S. 
troops from Iraq by 2011, while handing over responsibilities to Iraqi security forces and 
gradually increasing U.S. troops in Afghanistan, 102 it is apparent that rebuilding efforts 
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in both countries will likely create new business opportunities for the private military 
sector. Considering current security problems in both Iraq and Afghanistan, which have 
weak governments and poor economies, it can be said that demand for PMCs will not 
diminish in the following ten or fifteen years, but rather is likely to increase. Given that, 
the reliance on PMCs by the United States government is likely to continue, it is 
important for governmental agencies to learn how to work with them. In this context, the 
objective of this thesis is to examine the roles that PMCs play in current stabilization and 
reconstruction efforts, and to analyze how PMCs can become useful instruments in 
contingency operations if they are properly outsourced, managed, supervised, and 
regulated. In this regard, this thesis will primarily focus on the question of how to better 
utilize PMCs in contingency operations. Other questions that this thesis will seek to 
answer are: 1) which tasks should be given to PMCs in contingency operations? 2) how 
should they be monitored and managed on the ground? And, 3) how should they be 
regulated so that they do not undermine stabilization and reconstruction efforts?   
This thesis largely rests on regular official reports of the Congressional Research 
Service (CRS), Government Accountability Office (GAO), Special Inspector General for 
Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 
(SIGAR), Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB).  We will also use some milestone books in the area, and provide the reader with 
the current literature of journals and articles. This thesis aims to carry Nihat 
Dumlupinar’s arguments one step further by focusing on how the United States, which 
extensively uses PMCs in Iraq and Afghanistan, can exert better control over PMCs so 
that stabilization and reconstruction efforts are not undermined by those companies’ 
misconduct or non-compliance with the terms and conditions of their contracts.  
J. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
In the second chapter, basics of outsourcing PMCs will be examined and that 
there are generally two fundamental factors for governmental agencies that affect make-
or-buy decisions will be discussed. The first one is transaction cost economics (TCE), 
which seeks to explain how firms operate in the market, how transaction costs influence 
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make-or-buy decisions, what restricts the boundaries of firms, and what firms do to 
protect themselves from the potential contractual hazards. The second factor that 
influences make-or-buy decisions is inherently governmental functions, also called 
“sovereign functions” in TCE theory. Inherently governmental functions try to establish 
political and legal boundaries of outsourcing, framing the role of governmental agencies 
in fulfilling inbred responsibilities that cannot be delegated to any other entity.  
In the third chapter, primary mechanisms that the United States government 
agencies use to control PMCs will be examined. This chapter will seek to answer the 
question of how the United States may use oversight mechanisms to better manage PMCs 
in contingency operations. Principal-agent theory, and new institutionalism will provide a 
basis for the theoretical framework of this chapter. It will be argued that unless effective 
management and oversight mechanisms are established, not only may costs increase, but 
also policy objectives are negatively affected, due to waste, corruption, and abuse.  
In the fourth chapter, some underlying problems regarding regulating PMCs in 
contingency operations will be examined to better understand how the current regulatory 
framework exempts private military personnel from prosecution in some cases. It will be 
debated that PMCs may undermine stabilization and reconstruction efforts when they are 
not regulated properly. The main argument of this chapter is that since there is no 
overarching authority in the current international system, and since failed states are not 
capable of exerting control over private military activity, the contracting state is the only 
entity that can properly regulate and effectively use PMCs in contingency operations. It 
will be highlighted that even though there are regulations at the national level, states are 
either incapable or unwilling to apply sanctions for different reasons. This chapter 
proposes that the United States, Iraq, and Afghanistan may use the Montreux Document 
The fifth chapter will recap the arguments made in the previous chapters and 
provide overall considerations on how governmental agencies of the United States can 
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II. OUTSOURCING PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 
A. BACKGROUND 
In this chapter, basics of outsourcing PMCs will be examined. For governmental 
agencies, there are generally two fundamental factors that affect make-or-buy decisions. 
The first is transaction cost economics (TCE), which focuses on how transaction costs 
influence make-or-buy decisions, what restricts the boundaries of firms, and what firms 
do to protect themselves from potential contractual hazards. The second factor that 
influences make-or-buy decisions is inherently governmental functions, which is also 
called “sovereign functions” in TCE theory. Inherently governmental functions try to 
establish political and legal boundaries for outsourcing, framing the role of governmental 
agencies in fulfilling responsibilities that cannot be delegated to any other entity.   
Before discussing transaction cost economics and inherently governmental 
functions, it is important to identify a significant distinction between two similar 
concepts: outsourcing, and privatization. In the literature, these two concepts are 
sometimes considered to be synonymous, so are used interchangeably; however, they 
have two distinct meanings. While outsourcing refers to a temporary business 
relationship in which the principal retains all ownership rights, including the ultimate 
responsibility over the implementation of the outsourced function, privatization points to 
a long-term business relationship in which the ownership belongs to the agent, as long as 
the agent complies with the terms and conditions of the contract.103 This distinction is 
important, because incorrect usage of these concepts may cause misunderstandings. More 
importantly, the direction of accountability shifts, as each term refers to different rights 
and responsibilities by means of the principal-agent relationship. 
According to Stan Soloway and Alan Chvotkin, outsourcing is a reflection of 
three primary trends, “a fundamental shift in the role and ownership of technology, nearly 
revolutionary change in the management of business and institutions of all kinds, and 
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difficulties on the part of the government in recruiting and retaining the talent necessary 
for technologically driven service delivery.”104 They state that outsourcing, which is the 
natural product of these factors, is an important tool for the government to achieve its 
missions. Some specialists acknowledge that when properly managed, outsourcing for 
some functions may lead to higher performance, increasing the efficiency of service 
delivery. Others deny this argument and claim that outsourcing is an intentional policy to 
make the government seem smaller.  
With the end of the Cold War, budget cuts by the United States Congress forced 
the Department of Defense to economize.105 Officials believed that outsourcing some 
support functions would save money as well as increase efficiency. A March 1996 DoD 
report states, “Like the best companies and organizations in the United States, DoD has 
embarked on a systematic and vigorous effort to reduce the cost and improve the 
performance of its support activities.”106 Another report, “Outsourcing and 
Privatization,” issued by the Defense Science Board Task Force in 1996, advises DoD to 
outsource its support functions except ones that are inherently governmental.107 In this 
sense, the increasing reliance on PMCs on the battlefield is an outgrowth of a strategic 
decision made immediately after the end of the Cold War to replace military personnel in 
some areas, such as logistics, food, housing and other basic life support, with PMC 
personnel, so that military could focus on its core missions, such as war-fighting. 
This chapter will primarily focus on the role of governmental agencies in 
outsourcing. It will be explained how governmental agencies such as the Department of 
Defense, Department of State, and United States Agency for International Development 
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(USAID), which mainly produce services for public good, make decisions about 
outsourcing. Also discussed will be how outsourcing has exposed these governmental 
agencies to the same market dynamics as private corporations, pushing them to behave 
similarly to firms concerning decisions about outsourcing. Although governmental 
agencies are different from firms in many ways, TCE helps us to better understand the 
main dilemma of contracting from these agencies’ perspectives: when it makes sense to 
produce a particular good or service internally, and when it makes sense to outsource 
it.108  
B. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) 
Economists have long sought to understand why firms exist and how markets 
work. Ronald Harry Coase, who is accepted as the founder of transaction cost economics, 
states that firms are organized to cut down on transaction costs and operate in the market, 
in which “the distribution of resources is organized by the price mechanism.”109 Coase 
maintains that unlike firms, which are governed, markets work themselves, similar to 
organisms.110 He defines the market as an institution that “exist(s) to facilitate exchange” 
between firms, which produce diverse goods and services for human needs.111 He states 
that markets function “in order to reduce the cost of carrying out exchange 
transactions.”112 In this respect, transaction costs become the prominent factor that affect 
“make-or buy” decisions of firms, which have to choose between two major alternatives: 
contracting out a particular activity, or performing it within the firm.113  
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What then are transaction costs? Coase defines transaction costs as “the cost of 
using the price mechanism,” “the cost of carrying out a transaction by means of an 
exchange on the open market,” or in simplest terms, “marketing costs.”114 Similar to 
Coase’s definition of transaction costs, Kenneth J. Arrow elucidates the concept as “the 
cost of running the economic system.”115 Another economist, Dahlman, classifies 
transaction costs as “search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, and 
policing and enforcement costs.”116 As it is clearly understood from the definitions and 
classifications provided by prominent economists of the field, it is not possible to think of 
any economic exchange without involvement of transaction costs. For example, when a 
firm decides to purchase or sell a particular amount of stock, it needs to pay a 
commission to the stockbroker in return for making this transaction. This money is a 
transaction cost for the firm, so transaction cost is something that a firm must undergo if 
it wants to participate in the market.   
Similar to firms, governmental agencies also face typical transaction costs when 
dealing with PMCs. These transaction costs mainly entail costs associated with accessing 
market information, selection, contract management, and monitoring.117 Transaction 
costs are specific to the transaction itself, and stem from the very contractual relationship 
between trading partners. In this regard, thorough analysis of transaction costs is vital to 
determining if it is in a governmental agency’s best interest to contract with a PMC or if 
it is better to use in-house capacity to carry out the same function.  
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1. The Importance of TCE in Cost Efficiency Analysis 
In a typical make-or-buy decision, governmental agencies generally use the cost 
benefit analysis.118 However, transaction costs are often ignored in these analyses. Even 
though transaction costs significantly increase in contingency operations, governmental 
agencies for the most part neglect them while making their calculations. This is largely 
because of the transactional complexity of the contingency contracting. Uncertainty is 
high, and opportunism is likely in such environments. Therefore, it is relatively difficult 
for governmental agencies to precisely estimate the transaction costs of contracting with a 
PMC to perform a particular function in contingency operations.  
Unlike firms, which mainly produce economic goods and services, governmental 
agencies largely produce public goods and services. Conventional wisdom says that 
governmental agencies are less bound by cost-efficiency than are firms. However, the 
importance of cost-efficiency in governmental agencies has been growing. Particularly 
after the end of the Cold War, cost-efficiency has increasingly become a remarkable 
feature of the governmental agencies in the United States. Henceforth, economizing on 
transaction costs to increase cost-efficiency has become a significant component of 
organizational decision-making in governmental agencies.  
In contingency operations, governmental agencies have basically two alternatives: 
using a military unit, or contracting with a PMC. In this context, in order to properly 
decide to contract out a particular function, governmental agencies need to know whether 
it is less expensive to use a PMC rather than a military unit or not. However, there are 
extraordinary difficulties in making a comparison between a PMC and a military unit. 
 First, pay is just one factor that determines the total costs. If governmental 
agencies just rely on direct or production costs in their make-or-buy decisions, they may 
fail to make the right decision, either by overestimating the possible benefits of 
outsourcing PMCs or by underestimating the actual costs of outsourcing PMCs. 
Governmental agencies may waste taxpayer’s dollars unless transaction costs are 
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thoroughly analyzed. How, for example, can costs associated with training, healthcare, 
retirement salaries, and compensations of military personnel be incorporated into 
calculations and compared? How should training costs for contractors, monitoring, 
information and contract management costs be taken into account while making 
comparisons between military units and PMC alternatives? Traditional cost analysis 
generally ignores these transaction costs.  
The second complication is that gathering detailed data with respect to PMCs and 
military personnel is painstaking. For instance, a March 2010 GAO report demonstrates 
that the Pentagon could not provide the GAO with critical data to make a comparison, 
since it does not have enough information regarding “the number of military personnel 
that would be needed to meet the contract requirements or the cost of training personnel 
to carry out security functions.”119  
The third complication is that even though there are aggregated data with regard 
to money spent on PMC, it is often difficult to break down this general data into 
individual contracts. For example, A 2008 CBO report states: “From 2003 through 2007, 
U.S. agencies awarded $85 billion in contracts for work to be principally performed in 
the Iraq theater, accounting for almost 20 percent of funding for operations in Iraq.”120 
The Department of Defense’s share in this total is almost 90 percent ($76 billion).121 
According to the CBO figures, total expenditure for private security services was 
between $6 billion and $10 billion during the 2003–2007 period.122 The CBO also notes 
that “between $3 billion and $4 billion of that spending was for obligations made directly 
by the U.S. government for private security services in Iraq.”123 Though providing a 
general picture, these figures are not comparable, since they do not give any idea of how 
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much the agency would spend if it performed the same tasks internally. At this point, it is 
useful to look at comparable figures to better understand whether PMCs are cost-
effective. 
What then is the cost of contractor personnel in comparison to military soldiers? 
Is outsourcing really cost-effective? The CBO released a cost comparison analysis of a 
PMC versus its military alternative in 2008.124 According to the report, “the costs of a 
private security contract are comparable with those of a U.S. military unit performing 
similar functions.”125 Nevertheless, “during peacetime, the private military contract 
would not have to be renewed, whereas the military unit would remain in the force 
structure.”126 To put it another way, there is no savings during wartime.127 The following 
chart presents detailed information regarding the CBO’s comparison. 
Costs of a Private Security Contract and a U.S. Military Alternative 
Cost of Army Infantry Units (Millions of 2008 dollars) 
Case 1-1.2 Units in 
Rotation Base 
Case 2-2.0 Units in 










of 2008 dollars) 
Military 
Personnel 
21.8 24.9 46.6 41.5 63.2 
Operations 33.2 7.4 40.6 12.4 45.6 
Equipment 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.8 1.2 
 
Total Costs 55.4 32.8 88.2 54.6 110.1 98.5 
 
Table 2.   Cost of a Private Security Contract and a U.S. Military Alternative  
(After Congressional Budget Office, Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in 
Iraq)  
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In this analysis, CBO took three types of costs into consideration while estimating 
the military unit’s cost: military personnel costs, operating costs, and equipment costs.128 
In the analysis, the military pay rates include “basic pay, subsistence and housing 
allowances, plus a federal tax advantage because those allowances are not taxed,”129 
however exclude “free health care for military families back home, and deferred benefits, 
such as pay and health care for those who receive military retirement benefits.”130 While 
estimating the costs associated with Blackwater employees, CBO took personnel, 
monitoring, contract management, equipment, and insurance costs into consideration.131 
Summations on both sides were then compared. Nonetheless, training costs on both sides 
are not incorporated into these calculations. This is partly because while staff of 
organizations are usually considered “assets,” money spend on their training is not 
recognized as “asset specific.”132 In other words, it is assumed that the investment in 
training of military personnel has no value to the organization, if these personnel leave 
the job.133 However, since human capital of PMC relies on former military personnel, 
who were already trained by the military in the past; calculations that exclude training 
costs may misrepresent the actual situation. 
The chart above shows that there is not much difference between Blackwater134 
and an Army infantry unit in terms of operational costs. However, this comparison does 
not reflect the real picture, since costs may change depending on the type of function that 
is outsourced, the length of contract, and the conditions under which the function is 
performed. Moreover, it is difficult to generalize these findings, as different PMCs would 
have different performances. On the other hand, there are considerable reasons that make 
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us believe that militaries are less efficient in the long-term than PMCs. Most significantly 
is that, unlike PMCs, militaries are idle in peacetime. From the government’s perspective, 
the money, which is spent on weapon, equipment, and manpower in peacetime, is a lost 
economic output, since most of this capital is idle when not being used.135 Therefore, 
rather than maintaining huge forces that must be paid and trained periodically, sometimes 
outsourcing some tasks to PMCs only when necessary may be cost-effective. For 
example, in 2005, CBO estimated that over a 20-year period including both peacetime 
and wartime, outsourcing logistical functions to PMCs would cost around $41 billion, 
whereas obtaining the same logistical functions from the United States military would 
cost approximately $78 billion.136 This estimation clearly shows that it is profitable for 
the Department of Defense to outsource some logistical functions to PMCs. PMCs also 
perform other functions, such as security, military training and military advice. In order 
to figure out which functions PMCs execute more efficiently, performances of PMCs and 
militaries must be measured and compared on a case-by-case basis. Although it is 
relatively easier to measure costs associated with logistics, it is more difficult to measure 
costs related to functions like security, military training and advice. Alternatively, it may 
sometimes be costly to utilize PMCs, particularly when there is no effective oversight 
mechanism to keep their activities under control. Paying for duplicate services, fraud, and 
sustainability problems of the reconstruction projects may yield unintended consequences 
if PMCs are not properly managed and supervised. In fact, effective monitoring and good 
contract management are themselves costly, even if there is no fraud. 
2. Size of Governmental Agencies 
From a TCE perspective, the optimal size for a particular company and the things 
that it buys, produces, and sells, are by and large determined by transaction costs. The 
critical point is reached when the cost of organizing a transaction within the firm 
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becomes equal to the cost of executing it through the market.137 This threshold restricts 
the size of firms operating in the market. According to Coase, as firms become larger, the 
costs of organizing a particular transaction internally may increase because the 
“entrepreneur fails to make the best use of the factors of production.”138 Then firms try to 
optimize their sizes to produce the most efficient outcome by becoming larger (keeping 
the operation in-house) when the internal costs are less than the costs of the exchange 
transaction in the open market, or becoming smaller (contracting out) as internal costs 
surpass market costs. In other words, transaction costs determine the optimal size of 
firms. 
On the contrary, the size of governmental agencies is determined not only by 
transaction costs but also by the political context. During the post-Cold War period, 
public pressure on United States Congress with respect to more efficient use of taxpayer 
dollars has played a significant role in critical decision-making pertaining to downsizing 
of governmental agencies. In addition, the change in perception of threat has pushed 
governmental agencies to downsize in the aftermath of the Cold War. The possibility of a 
nuclear war during the Cold War led to large and crowded governmental agencies in the 
United States with central decision-making structures.139 However, the end of the Cold 
War has changed the perception of threat. As a response to the elimination of Soviet 
threat, the United States Congress has downsized its governmental agencies. After 9/11, 
United States has declared global war on terrorism and conducted contingency operations 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. These operations have required governmental agencies to be 
more adaptable, flexible, and divisible.140 As a practical solution, governmental agencies 
have increasingly begun to rely on PMCs in contingency operations. However, this 
solution has not always brought about greater cost-efficiency on the part of governmental 
agencies.  
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In sum, transaction cost is an important factor that determines the optimal size of 
government agencies; however, it is not the only factor. There is a significant difference 
between a governmental agency and a firm: sovereign functions. While governmental 
agencies are bound by a social contract that holds them responsible for performing 
sovereign functions, firms do not bear any responsibility in this regard. The impact of 
sovereign functions, or “inherently governmental functions,” on organizational decision-
making about outsourcing will be examined later. Nevertheless, it is crucial to highlight 
that the assessment of the trade-off between keeping these functions in-house and 
outsourcing them is more complex than doing basic mathematical calculations. It requires 
measuring possible socio-political outcomes, as well as long-term benefits and losses of 
the decision. Moreover, training costs for contractors, which are often ignored, need to be 
taken into account. 
3. Governance Structures and Outsourcing 
TCE also studies how firms adopt institutional alternatives in order to protect their 
interests at minimum costs.141 From a TCE perspective, the governance structure or the 
organizational form, which is the dependent variable, is determined by three main 
independent variables: asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency.142 Of these 
independent variables, frequency is typically omitted from debates, despite its significant 
impact on institutional transformations, because it is assumed that no firm would 
integrate vertically to produce a good or service that is rarely used. Therefore, TCE 
presupposes that a firm would only want to integrate vertically when the transaction is 
frequent.  
The second variable, uncertainty, is often attributed to the absence of necessary 
information about the future. Since no firm can foresee the contingent events with a 
hundred percent accuracy, contracts always include some level of uncertainty. The 
perception of uncertainty is for the most part contingent upon the length of the contract. 
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Long contracts usually bring more uncertainty than shorter ones. As the contract’s 
timeframe gets bigger, the likelihood of incompleteness increases accordingly. The logic 
here is that it is more likely that a governmental agency would be concerned about 
deviations from the contract or possible breaches of terms and conditions written in the 
contract if the contract encompasses relatively longer periods of time. Moreover, longer 
contracts naturally bring their own issues regarding opportunism. Unfortunately, 
uncertainty provides PMCs with advantages over governmental agencies. PMCs use 
every opportunity to increase their profit margin where monitoring is difficult. This is 
especially the case when states hire PMCs to execute some tasks under highly uncertain 
conditions, such as contingency operations.  
Perhaps the most important contribution that TCE made to the literature is the 
third variable: asset-specificity. Williamson describes asset specificity as “durable 
investments that are undertaken in support of particular transactions, the opportunity cost 
of which investments are is much lower in best alternative uses or by alternative users 
should the original transaction be prematurely terminated.”143 TCE asserts that if a 
particular transaction contains highly specific assets, the transaction cost of insourcing is 
likely to be smaller than that of outsourcing, so it is better for the firm to make it 
internally, rather than buying it. Similarly, governmental agencies must be careful about 
asset specificity as well. They must refrain from contracting with PMCs that provide 
highly specific assets, such as specialized human capital and sophisticated weapon 
systems. If a governmental agency contracts with a PMC that provides such kind of 
specific assets, it may be reliant on the provision of these assets by this PMC in the long 
run. In this case, the PMC can renegotiate the terms and conditions of the contract as it 
holds unfair and asymmetrical leverage due to this highly specific asset. 
According to Williamson, governance is “the institutional framework within 
which the integrity of a transaction is decided.”144 He sets forth that while seeking to find 
the best form of government structure, firms must also take two primary structural factors 
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into account: adaptability and coordination. Adaptability refers to structural 
characteristics like autonomy, independence, and responsiveness; whereas, coordination 
connotes compliance and control. As clearly seen in the table presented below, he 
introduces three primary types of governance structures, each of which reflects different 
combinations of these structural features.  
 
Table 1 Governance Structures 
Criteria Hierarchy Hybrid Market 
Adaptability Weak Semi-strong Strong 
Coordination Strong Semi-strong Weak 
Efficiency Weak Semi-strong Strong 
Control Strong Semi-strong Weak 
Table 3.   Governance Structures (After Oliver E. Williamson, Public and Private 
Bureaucracies: Transaction Cost Economics Perspective) 
The first structure is the market, in which prices provide strong incentives for 
entrepreneurs to take advantage of profit opportunities. In this structure, market dynamics 
shape the participants’ behavior, requiring them to be opportunistic and rational, even if 
limitedly.145 Information plays a key role in market dynamics, providing advantages in 
terms of adaptation. TCE asserts that market structure is the most efficient means of 
resource use; however, it is the worst in terms of protection of specific investments.  
The second type of organizational form is the hierarchy, which is also called a 
“fully integrated,” or “highly centralized” organizational form. Hierarchies seek to 
maximize control and coordination.146 Efficiency and adaptation are secondary focuses in 
hierarchies. It is generally assumed in TCE literature that internal production is less 
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efficient than market transactions because internal employees have low-powered 
incentives to work, while employees of market organizations have generally high-
powered incentives to compete. This makes market organizations more opportunistic than 
fully integrated organizations. TCE also posits that hierarchy is the most suitable form of 
structure in terms of offering protection for specific assets; however, it is less effective 
than markets when it comes to the best use of resources.  
Between these two alternatives lays another type of governance structure: hybrid 
type organizations. Hybrid type of governance structure reduces disadvantages of both 
markets and hierarchies, incorporating a combination of coordination and adaptation to 
the organizational form.147 
The general characteristic of organizational structure that governmental agencies 
in the United States adopted during the Cold War was primarily defensive in nature, due 
largely to the Soviet threat. The main concerns of governmental agencies at that time 
were control and coordination, for which cost-efficiency and adaptability could be 
compromised.148 When the end of the Cold War terminated the Soviet threat, cost-
efficiency became more and more important for governmental agencies in the United 
States. In turn, the United States Congress has downsized governmental agencies while 
outsourcing PMCs for various functions previously only performed by governmental 
agencies themselves. Adopting a new form of governance structure, governmental 
agencies in the United States had shifted from pure hierarchies to hybrid type of 
organizations, which seek to find the best compromise between control-coordination and 
adaptability-efficiency dimensions through contracting with PMCs to carry out various 
functions. Now, it was control and coordination that would be compromised for the sake 
of greater cost-efficiency and adaptation. 
As a result, outsourcing has pushed governmental agencies in the United States to 
shift from hierarchies to hybrid form of governance structures, particularly after the end 
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of the Cold War. Therefore, they become more vulnerable to hazards of asset specificity 
and uncertainty. PMCs, which provide highly specific assets in uncertain environments, 
pose many challenges to governmental agencies in contingency operations. Depending on 
the nature of the function, governmental agencies may adopt different governance 
structures. Hierarchy is best in terms of implementing sovereign functions, while hybrid 
form of governance provides governmental agencies with considerable advantages of 
both cost-efficiency and control if effectively regulated. Market structure is apparently 
not suitable for governmental agencies, despite its obvious advantages by means of cost 
efficiency, because control, coordination and bureaucracy are indispensable elements of 
their governance structures. 
4. Contractual Hazards 
Inarguably, contractual hazards increase transaction costs and decrease the 
efficiency of organizations. In this regard, how firms shield themselves from hazards with 
regard to exchange relationships in the market is central to TCE.149  
TCE claims that in a complex economic system, contracts are usually incomplete 
for two reasons: bounded rationality and opportunism.150 TCE posits that in any 
contractual relationship, rationality of partners is restricted by limited knowledge, limited 
time, and limited cognitive skills. It is considered that decision-makers on both sides use 
their constrained knowledge, skills and resources to reach a satisfying outcome, instead 
of an optimal outcome. Furthermore, TCE supposes that agents are opportunist entities 
that have strong incentives to maximize their self-interests, adapting to changing 
conditions and new circumstances.  
It is widely accepted that every economic relationship is based on some kind of 
exchange between trading partners. In this sense, TCE maintains that in any exchange, 
one side may seek to appropriate the rents that accumulated, using its positional, legal, 
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technological, or informational advantage.151 Since there are potential hazards inherent in 
a particular economic relationship, both sides need to take precautions to protect their 
core interests. Firms generally employ a variety of governance structures to maximize 
their profits, while defending themselves from contractual hazards, depending on the 
particular characteristics of the transaction.  
Williamson applies TCE to public agencies, trying to explain why hierarchies are 
more appropriate for accomplishing sovereign tasks than markets.152 He notes that states 
may become reliant on the professional excellence of contractors if they decide to 
delegate their authority by contracting out some sovereign tasks, such as “foreign affairs, 
the military, foreign intelligence, managing the money supply, and, possibly, the 
judiciary.”153 He draws attention to possible contractual hazards inherent in contracting 
these sovereign tasks, namely asset-specificity, uncertainty, and probity hazards.154  
a. The Hazard of Asset Specificity 
The hazard of asset specificity is apparent if dependency is established 
asymmetrically bilateral.155 If in a certain contractual relationship the agent becomes 
more powerful than the principal in terms of highly specific assets that provide the agent 
with informational, positional, or technological advantages over the principal, the hazard 
of asset specificity takes place. For instance, capabilities of some PMCs that operate in 
contingencies are highly specific assets, such as weapon systems, logistics systems, 
managerial systems, and well-trained human capital. Private military industry, which 
provides these highly asset specific goods and services, may pose serious dangers to 
sovereign nations relying on them, depending on the level of interaction and 
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interdependence between PMCs and states.  For example; PMCs may threaten to end the 
contract, using its bargaining advantage that stems from an asymmetrical contractual 
relationship and may leave the state vulnerable to hold-up.156  
b. The Hazard of Uncertainty 
It is widely acknowledged that uncertainty has a negative impact on firms’ 
efficiency. Economic organizations seek to operate in a predictable environment, where 
uncertainty is low. Uncertainty brings about institutional myopia and shortsightedness 
that generally prevents firms from investing in long-term projects, affecting all basic 
decisions about production, consumption, purchase, leasing, and investment. In addition 
to these negative impacts, uncertainty also negatively influences contractual 
relationships, adding a kind of asymmetrical advantage for the agent and leaving the 
principal vulnerable to potential hazards of uncertainty. It can be said that in contractual 
relationships, the agent has more incentives to take advantage of uncertainty than has the 
principal. Particularly when the agent performs its given tasks geographically far from 
the principal, or in places where uncertainty is high, the principal faces the hazard of 
uncertainty. For example, private contractors may take advantage of the chaos in 
wartime. PMCs can easily exploit taxpayers’ dollars in times of war, as monitoring 
becomes much more difficult for the government agencies through war profiteering. They 
can overcharge their principals and commit frauds. In this regard, uncertainty provides 
much more leverage for PMCs than for governmental agencies.  
In TCE literature, it is generally accepted that uncertainty is one of the 
important factors that increases transaction costs; however, it is not the only factor. 
Conventional wisdom in TCE literature says that asset specificity, when taken into 
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account with uncertainty, is a significant determinant of make-or-buy decisions.157 In this 
sense, a governmental agency would more likely keep an operation in-house when this 
operation reflects its core competency, when uncertainty and asset specificity become 
more evident, and when it becomes harder to measure the quality of the service that the 
contractor provides.158 Otherwise, governmental agency would more likely outsource the 
same activity in order to economize on transaction costs. 
c. The Hazard of Probity 
Central to the hazard of probity lays a straightforward concern: will the 
agent perform its tasks in full capacity and in a way that the principal demands? How, for 
instance, can the principal be sure that the agent will not shirk by unilaterally putting an 
end to the contract or simply switching sides? Once the principal delegates authority to 
the agent, it follows that he naturally wants his agent to be loyal to his objectives and not 
to misuse the power that is given. 
In this respect, the hazard of probity refers to the moral and legal quality 
of the relationship between principals and agents. Williamson defines probity as “the 
loyalty and the rectitude with which . . . the transaction is discharged.”159 He maintains 
that probity requires a high level of integrity.160 Philip Selznick states, “The chief virtue 
of integrity is fidelity to self-defining principles.”161 Keeping that in mind, do PMCs 
respect the long-term objectives of states?  
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The answer to this question largely depends on how a particular PMC 
defines its mission and objectives, how detailed the contract is established, and how well 
the contract is supervised. Considering the dangers associated with the absence of 
integrity in the private military sector, is there any other mechanism that keeps PMCs 
from shirking? Many scholars claim that reputational considerations prevent PMCs from 
switching sides, committing crimes, or unilaterally putting an end to the contract. 
However, states have to do more than expect the sector to control itself to be sure that 
ultimate objectives are not damaged. Minow claims that public accountability is put in 
danger when actors hired by the government “are not governed by anyone but 
themselves.”162 To better understand why PMCs should be controlled by effective 
oversight mechanisms, we need to remember a significant difference between a military 
and a PMC. Unlike militaries, private security is not considered to be a profession. 
Personnel who work for PMCs have not internalized all of the characteristics that are 
required for professionalism. As mentioned in the first chapter, social responsibility and 
corporateness are not common characteristics in the private military sector. Although 
they hold a considerable amount of expertise, this factor alone does not make private 
security a profession. Therefore, probity hazard is likely in contracts with PMCs, 
particularly during contingency operations. For this reason, PMCs must be controlled 
through various mechanisms to ensure that they work in harmony with foreign policy 
goals of governmental agencies. PMCs can be forced to accept some professional norms, 
but without effective monitoring and punishing systems, abuses cannot be prevented. 
Thus far, TCE is highlighted to show how governmental agencies are 
organized and how they make decisions about outsourcing. Transaction cost economics, 
which mostly focuses on effectiveness and efficiency dimensions, is an important factor 
that must be taken into account in make-or-buy decisions. Nevertheless, it is not the only 
factor in terms of governmental agencies. Another important factor that has a significant 
impact on the decision-making processes of governmental agencies regarding 
outsourcing particular functions to PMCs will now be discussed, that is, “inherently 
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governmental functions.” Inherently governmental functions are important because they 
complete the trinity by adding a “control” perspective over outsourcing. 
C. INHERENTLY GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS 
The question of which functions are inherently governmental and which functions 
should be executed by the private sector have long been debated in the United States, 
where the federal government and the private sector have cooperated to implement 
strategic tasks associated with U.S. foreign policy objectives. In this respect, the 
Department of Defense was central to these debates, since it has played a key role in 
federal contracting with its unique structure that blends military and private military 
personnel.163  
The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, which was 
established by the United States Congress in 2008, issued an interim report in June 2009. 
The report states that understaffing of contingency contracting workforce has resulted in 
hiring contractors for potentially inherently governmental functions.164 According to the 
report: 
Understaffing is one of the most critical barriers to effective contract 
management. The shortage of properly trained acquisition professionals is 
evident in all phases of the acquisition process—from requirements 
generation to post‐award execution and contract close‐out. Understaffing 
affects other areas as well. Leadership seeks alternative solutions, and the 
path of least resistance has resulted in hiring contractors to fill the staffing 
void. This response to understaffing puts contractors in a position to 
potentially perform inherently governmental actions.165  
The United States even contracted out coordination of PMCs in contingency 
operations. In 2004, Aegis Defense Services, which is a United Kingdom-based PMC, 
was awarded a three-year contract, which was then renewed in 2007 for two years, to 
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coordinate the activities of more than fifty PMCs operating in the Iraq theatre.166 
Currently the staff of Aegis continues to perform interagency coordination functions in 
Afghanistan, as contractors of Armed Contractor Oversight Directorate (ACOD).167 
The basic problem with inherently governmental functions is that there is no 
consensus about what those functions are. Inconsistent definitions are abundant. The 
literature regarding inherently governmental functions provides two primary definitions. 
The first is a statutory definition. The Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act of 
1998 describes an inherently governmental function as “a function so intimately related 
to the public interest as to require performance by Federal Government employees.”168 
FAIR Act provides elaboration on the meaning of the definition, but does not list 
inherently governmental functions and commercial activities.169 FAIR Act states that 
inherently governmental functions include functions that “determine, protect, and 
advance United States’ economic, political, territorial, property, or other interests by 
military or diplomatic action, civil or criminal justice proceedings,” contract 
management, and functions that “significantly affect the life, liberty, or property of 
private persons . . .”170  
The second definition is a policy definition. The Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 similarly defines the term as “an activity that is so 
intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance by government 
personnel.”171 However, it states that outsourcing certain types of services such as “guard 
services, convoy and plant protection services, pass and identification services, and 
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operation of prison or detention facilities” is not forbidden.172 It lists which activities are 
commercial and clearly forbids contracting out inherently governmental functions.173 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) incorporates the policy definition of 
inherently governmental functions of OMB Circular A-76. FAR neither provides 
elaboration on the meaning of the definition, nor defines commercial activities; however, 
it presents a list of inherently governmental functions.174 It explicitly prohibits 
outsourcing inherently government functions and addresses functions closely related to 
inherently governmental functions.175  
In June 2006, DoD amended the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(DFARS), which is known as the DoD implementation of the FAR, by adding an extra, 
and exceptional rule for PMCs. According to this amendment, private security 
contractors are given an authorization of using deadly force “only when necessary to 
execute their security mission to protect assets/persons, consistent with the mission 
statement contained in their contract.”176 DoD thinks that combat functions are inherently 
governmental functions, but some security functions may be considered commercial.177 
DoD authorizes the combatant commander to decide whether a particular security 
function is commercial or not.178  
Different statutes and regulations contain other definitions, but they are 
derivations and reproductions of the two definitions mentioned above, and are similar to 
those of the FAIR Act and OMB Circular.179 Agencies mostly make their own 
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interpretations regarding which functions are inherently governmental functions, so there 
is no single definition. Bruneau draws attention to the political side of the story:  
By condoning a vague and ambiguous definition of what activities are 
inherently governmental, those agencies of the U.S. government with 
oversight responsibility have allowed the market, including the lobbying 
that is a hallmark of our political marketplace, to spread into tasks, roles 
and missions that were previously considered the purview of the federal 
government. Now that PMCs have taken on the missions that were 
previously inherently governmental, and developed clienteles through the 
use of campaign funds and lobbyists, it is extremely difficult to turn the 
trend around.180 
Some experts propose that replacement of the term “inherently governmental 
functions” with another phrase such as “core functions,” “mission essential functions,” or 
“critical government functions” would put an end to this confusion. They believe that the 
“inherently governmental functions” concept is so abstract and so general that it leaves 
governmental agencies in limbo. Core or mission essential or critical functions, on the 
other hand, connote more concrete meanings, since they points to agencies’ central 
activities which are vital for the accomplishment of their core tasks and which could have 
harmful impacts on their performance, reputation or existence if not performed internally.  
Maogato and Sheehy argue that when a state outsources a function that is 
normally inherently governmental, its “monopoly on the legitimate use of force” is 
fragmented.181 As PMCs gradually take over responsibilities that previously only 
belonged to militaries, the very foundation of state is undermined. In turn, states begin to 
lose control over use of force piece by piece, and state responsibility is put in danger. 
Therefore, it is better for states not to outsource certain functions that are intimately 
associated with the very reason for their presence. The Montreux Document, for example, 
clearly states that international law prohibits contracting inherently governmental 
functions out, such as “supervision of prisoner-of-war camps and civilian places of 
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internment.”182 According to the document, states should decide which service is 
inherently governmental and which services are commercial, taking into consideration 
whether outsourcing a particular service would lead PMC to directly take part in 
hostilities or not.183 The performance of certain functions by PMCs during the 
implementation of combat operations is also addressed by the Duncan Hunter National 
Defense Authorization Act. As Section 832 of the Act articulates: 
“. . . (1) security operations for the protection of resources (including 
people, information, equipment, and supplies) in uncontrolled or 
unpredictable high-threat environments should ordinarily be performed by 
members of the Armed Forces if they will be performed in highly 
hazardous public areas where the risks are uncertain and could reasonably 
be expected to require deadly force that is more likely to be initiated by 
personnel performing such security operations than to occur in self-
defense; 
(2) it should be in the sole discretion of the commander of the relevant 
combatant command to determine whether or not the performance by a 
private security contractor under a contract awarded by any Federal 
agency of a particular activity, a series of activities, or activities in a 
particular location, within a designated area of combat operations is 
appropriate and such a determination should not be delegated to any 
person who is not in the military chain of command; 
(3) the Secretaries of the military departments and the Chiefs of Staff of 
the Armed Forces should ensure that the United States Armed Forces have 
appropriate numbers of trained personnel to perform the functions 
described in paragraph (1) without the need to rely upon private security 
contractors; and 
(4) the regulations issued by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to section 
862(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 
(Public Law 110–181; 122 Stat. 254; 10 U.S.C. 2302 note) should ensure 
that private security contractors are not authorized to perform inherently 
govern- mental functions in an area of combat operations.184 
Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act clearly states that in 
uncontrollable and unpredictable environments, in which the use of deadly force is likely, 
PMCs should not perform inherently governmental functions. The Act also requires 
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United States Armed Forces to adopt adequate numbers of trained personnel to execute 
these functions. Furthermore, as we discussed earlier, outsourcing some sovereign 
functions is directly associated with understaffing of the contingency contracting 
workforce. Therefore, there is a need to increase in-house capacities of governmental 
agencies both in terms of trained military personnel and by means of acquisition 
professionals so that inherently governmental functions are only performed by 
governmental agencies. 
D. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, two primary factors that determine make-or-buy decisions of 
governmental agencies are examined. The first factor is transaction cost economics and 
the second factor is inherently governmental functions, which is also called as “sovereign 
functions” in TCE theory.  
TCE shows how governmental agencies make decisions about outsourcing. It is 
discussed that although governmental agencies are different from firms in many ways, 
outsourcing has exposed governmental agencies to the same market dynamics as private 
corporations, pushing them to behave in a similar way to firms when it comes to deciding 
whether to keep the function in-house or contract it out. It is discussed that governmental 
agencies would more likely to keep an operation in-house when this operation reflects its 
core competency, when uncertainty and asset specificity become more evident, and when 
it becomes harder to measure the quality of the service that the contractor provides. 
Otherwise, governmental agencies would be more likely to outsource the same activity, 
to economize on transaction costs.  
Inherently governmental functions, which try to establish political and legal 
boundaries of outsourcing, are emphasized to show that they play a key role in decision-
making regarding using PMCs for certain tasks in contingency operations, restricting 
governmental organizations from contracting out some core or sovereign functions. It is 
indicated that the basic problem with inherently governmental functions is that there is no 
consensus about what those functions are. 
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TCE sets forth three types of contractual hazards: asset specificity hazard, 
uncertainty hazard, and probity hazard. It is argued that the private military industry, 
which provides highly asset-specific services, may pose serious dangers to sovereign 
nations relying on them, determining the level of interaction and interdependence 
between PMCs and states. With regard to uncertainty hazard, it is noted that PMCs have 
more incentives to take advantage of uncertainty than have states. When the agent 
performs its given tasks geographically far from the principal or in places where 
uncertainty is high, the principal faces the hazard of uncertainty. This chapter argued that 
probity hazard is likely in contracts with PMCs, since unlike militaries; private security is 
not considered to be a profession. For this reason, PMCs must be controlled through 
various mechanisms to ensure that they respect the policy objectives of the governmental 
agencies during contingency operations. PMCs can be forced to accept some professional 
norms, but without effective monitoring and punishing systems, abuses cannot be 
prevented.  
TCE perspective also states that for government agencies, rather than maintaining 
huge forces, which are required to be paid and trained periodically, outsourcing some 
tasks to PMCs only when necessary may sometimes be cost-effective. On the other hand, 
it may sometimes be costly to utilize PMCs, particularly when there is no effective 
oversight mechanism to keep their activities under control.  
This chapter also debated that in response to two structural characteristics 
(adaptability, and coordination) institutions adopt three different types of governance 
structures: hierarchy, hybrid, and market. TCE establishes that:  
 1. Market type of governance structure is the best in terms of 
adaptability; however, it is the worst by means of coordination. 
 2. Hierarchy is the best form in terms of coordination, but the worst 
by means of adaptability. 
 3. Hybrid type of governance structure requires small concessions in 
terms of both adaptability and coordination, providing the organization with some level 
of efficiency and control.  
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It is explained that hierarchies are more appropriate for accomplishing sovereign 
tasks than markets, partly because they are intentionally designed for coordination and 
partly because they focus on control. Hybrid form, on the other hand, runs the risk of 
poor performance in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, and control dimensions. 
Contractual hazards are more likely in hybrid form of organizations than are hierarchies. 
In this regard, it can be said that governmental agencies in the United States have shifted 
from hierarchies to hybrid form of organizations, as they began to rely on PMCs for some 
functions that are formerly thought to be an inherently governmental. Therefore, they 
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III. SUPERVISING AND MANAGING PRIVATE MILITARY 
COMPANIES 
A. GENERAL 
This chapter will seek to answer the question of how the United States may use 
oversight mechanisms to manage PMCs in contingency operations. It will be discussed 
that unless effective contract management and oversight mechanisms are established, not 
only may costs increase, but also policy goals are negatively affected due to waste, 
corruption, and abuse. 
Mostly because of urgent military needs in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. 
Congress provided governmental agencies with considerable flexibility in terms of 
existing procurement procedures.185 However, partly because of the dearth of the 
required capacity to oversee and partly because of the absence of commitment to 
supervise and manage contracts, finance and conduct related abuses followed.186 As 
congressional and media sources disclosed, the Halliburton Company overcharged the 
U.S. government $61 million for gasoline and $186 million for meals that were not 
served.187 An Army investigative report found that the absence of good contractor 
supervision, which promoted a tolerant environment, was the main reason behind the 
abuses at Abu Ghraib prison, where civilian interpreters and interrogators of CACI 
International and Titan Corporation committed various human rights crimes.188 As 
Schwartz states: “Many observers believe that the fallout from Abu Ghraib and other 
incidents, such as the shooting of Iraqi civilians by private security contractors hired by 
the United States government, have hurt the credibility of the U.S. military and 
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undermined efforts in Iraq.”189 It is emphasized in Field Manual 3.100-21, “to fully 
integrate contractor support into the theater operational support structure, proper military 
oversight of contractors is imperative.”190 However, what we see in Iraq and in 
Afghanistan is that this policy was never fully implemented.  
Particularly after these high profile incidents, the media, the public, and the 
United States Congress have raised many issues regarding the utilization of PMCs as a 
part of the United States’ efforts to rebuild Iraq and Afghanistan. Some of these concerns 
were directly associated with whether or not commanders had enough training on how to 
manage PMCs on the ground. By and large, these concerns were straightforward, as 
commanders in the battlefield complained about the vagueness of their authority to 
manage personnel of PMCs properly.191 For instance, it is reported that military 
personnel at Abu Ghraib prison neither received training about how to use contractors nor 
were informed about the terms of contracts.192 The confusion about how to manage 
PMCs on the ground was partly caused by insufficient training regarding the management 
of contractors in the battlefield and partly by commanders’ unclear lines of authority over 
PMCs. 
Largely due to allegations of corruption, abuse and waste of taxpayers’ dollars 
and sustainability problems of the reconstruction projects, the U.S. Congress established 
the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) in 2003, and Special 
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in 2008.193 The SIGIR, 
SIGAR, CRS, CBO, and GAO have all published regular audits, reports, inspections, and 
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lessons-learned regarding the use of PMCs in contingency operations.194 Various think 
tank organizations, NGOs, independent reporters, and the media have played important 
roles in investigations and have drawn public attention to the activities of PMCs 
operating in Iraq and Afghanistan.195 The United States Congress legislative branch has 
improved domestic laws and regulations to facilitate managing PMCs in contingency 
operations. However, as Bruneau argues, “There remains . . . a large gap between what 
has been mandated by law and the structures and the personnel available to meet those 
mandates.”196 
Keeping these existing problems in mind, this chapter will largely focus on how 
institutional mechanisms can help fill this large gap so that governmental agencies have 
higher control over PMCs to protect their interests. In this regard, this chapter mainly 
rests on New Institutionalism, which provides insight to structural mechanisms and the 
roles of institutions in bridging the gap between regulations and political commitment, 
and on Principal Agent Theory, which helps us better understand contractual hazards 
inherent in any employer-employee relationship that is asymmetrically established.   
B. NEW INSTITUTIONALISM 
Hall and Taylor define institutions as “the formal or informal procedures, 
routines, norms and conventions embedded in organizational structure of the polity or 
political economy.”197 What is important in this definition, even if it is not clearly stated, 
is that all institutions are human creations and are intentionally designed to fulfill a 
purpose.198 According to Bruneau, “…the process of creating and implementing 
institutions is all about power, and institutional power relations therefore are a primary 
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concern of New Institutionalism.”199 In this sense, New Institutionalism is a useful theory 
that helps us better understand organizational and systemic problems regarding 
supervising and managing PMCs in contingency operations. It attributes the challenges of 
controlling PMCs in wartime to the weaknesses or wrong organization of institutional 
environment. To summarize, the New Institutionalism perspective suggests that 
institutions that are capable of regulating PMCs should be strengthened and power 
relations among institutional mechanisms should be rearranged in a way that provides 
better control over PMCs. If weaknesses stem from the absence of an institution, this 
institution should be created to facilitate regulation.  
The rest of the chapter will largely rely on new institutionalism to highlight the 
importance of institutions in regulating PMCs in contingency operations. Fraud, waste 
and abuses by PMCs are evident where institutions are weak and where institutional 
mechanisms do not properly work. This is especially true for Iraq and Afghanistan. The 
democratic political institutions of these countries were by and large injected by the 
United States in the last decade. Thus, democratic institutions of Iraq and Afghanistan are 
relatively immature. In turn, both countries need considerable amount of time to embrace 
democracy and its institutional norms before properly enforcing laws and regulating 
PMCs. On the other hand, the United States has institutions with stronger capacity than 
those of Iraq and Afghanistan, so the United States could exert better control over PMCs 
than do Iraq and Afghanistan. However, this does not mean that there are no institutional 
problems in the United States. Therefore, this chapter will also address these institutional 
weaknesses and make recommendations on how to improve them. Now, we will turn to 
another theory that is useful for the purpose of this thesis.  
C. PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY 
“Principal-agent theory,” or “the principal agent framework” as accepted by some 
scholars, originated from transaction cost economics theory. According to Peter Feaver, 
the agent (employee) has an incentive to hide information from its principal (employer) 
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to increase his bargaining power.200 He states that the agent often seeks to take advantage 
of uncertainty and information asymmetry to gain a comparative advantage over the 
principal.201 Thus, monitoring becomes much more difficult for the principal, particularly 
when the agent is performing his tasks far from the principal and under uncertainty.202 In 
this respect, the principal-agent framework provides insight to contractual relationship 
between governmental agencies and PMCs, especially in contingency operations that take 
place in highly volatile environments, in which control, coordination, and communication 
is relatively difficult. 
Central to the principal agent theory lays a simple paradox: Once the employer 
(principal) delegates some of his authority to the employee (agent), how can he make 
sure that the agent is not shirking? Peter Feaver defines shirking as an agent’s deviant 
behavior from the principal’s functional and relational goals.203  
Feaver associates functional goals with the behavior of the agent:  
 Is the agent doing what the principal asked? 
 Is the agent working in full capacity? 
 Is the agent competent enough to do what is asked?204 
He links relational goals with critical decision-making:  
 Does the principal make key policy decisions?  
 Are these key decisions are substantive,  
 Does the principal adjudicate which decisions can be left to the agent, and  
 Does the agent refrain from any behavior that weakens principal’s 
authority even if it obeys principal’s functional orders.205  
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Feaver states that if all the answers to the questions mentioned above are yes, then 
the agent is working.206 However, if there is at least one negative answer, this means that 
agent is shirking.207 
There are two main dilemmas in any contractual relationship: adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems. Adverse selection refers to the moment of hiring and means 
that due to “perverse incentives for the agent to misrepresent himself,” the principal 
cannot completely be sure about “the true preferences and capabilities” of the agent.208 
The moral hazard problem, which refers to the behavior of the agent after being hired, 
means “the principal cannot completely observe the true behavior of the agent and so 
cannot be certain whether the agent is working or shirking.”209 Feaver suggests two 
mechanisms to prevent the agent from shirking: monitoring and punishment.210 Through 
monitoring mechanisms, such as contract incentives, screening and selection, fire alarms, 
institutional checks, police patrols, and revising delegation decisions, the principal may 
overcome his own asymmetrical information disadvantage by either increasing the 
pressure on the agent or creating incentives for him to reveal and share information.211 
Through punishing mechanisms, such as restrictive monitoring, material disincentives 
(current and future), military justice system, and extralegal action, the principal can 
ensure compliance of the agent.212 As a result, considering the adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems inherent in any principal-agent relationship; effective monitoring 
systems and punishment mechanisms are essential to keep the agent under control.  
The principal-agent theory is helpful, since it sets a clear framework regarding 
major problems that are inherent in relations between PMCs and the government. James 
Cockayne, who uses the principal-agent theory to explain how states may exert control 
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over PMCs, notes that similar to shirking of militaries, PMCs use different mechanisms 
and strategies to evade oversight.213 He claims that if the principal-agent relationship is 
not properly structured, states may become reliant on PMCs.214 Drawing attention to the 
fact that PMCs may play principals against each other, he warns states about the possible 
dangers of utilization of PMCs in certain situations.215  
Keeping these possible hazards in mind, we will turn to the nature of contractual 
dilemmas that influence the behaviors of both the principal and the agent. Understanding 
both sides’ concerns is important, especially for the principal, since any solution to exert 
better control over the agent must address these dilemmas. 
D. CONTRACTUAL DILEMMAS 
When the principal-agent framework is applied to contractual relationships 
between PMCs and governmental agencies, it becomes clear that both sides find 
themselves in certain dilemmas. These concerns shape not only their own behaviors, but 
also each other’s behaviors, and often create some tension in terms of their interests, 
objectives and ways of conduct.  
At the core of contractual dilemmas are conflicting interests of two distinct parties 
with different objectives.216 On the one hand, there is a public entity, which seeks to 
achieve its security goals while economizing on transactions costs; on the other hand, 
there is a private firm, which is organized to maximize its profit. As a result, these 
diverse interests are difficult to match, particularly if the market lacks openness and 
competitiveness, if the principal does not have effective oversight mechanisms to control 
the agent in terms of conformity, propriety, and adequacy of the services it provides, and 
if tasks would be performed in an uncertain environment that makes monitoring difficult. 
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Optimization of these two distinct interests requires adequate and accurate data with 
regard to past performances of PMCs, an open and competitive market, clear contract 
terms and conditions, transparency and close scrutiny on activities of PMCs, eradication 
of their murky legal status, and efforts to eliminate disadvantages regarding uncertainty 
and information asymmetry. Ignorance or incompleteness of these factors favors PMCs, 
increasing their asymmetrical advantage and bargaining power over their principals, and 
contractual dilemmas become inevitable.  
From the governmental agencies’ perspectives, the main contractual dilemma 
concerns delegating authority to an entity over which the government has little control. 
Therefore, deciding on whether to outsource a certain function or to keep it in-house is in 
a sense compromising between control-coordination and efficiency-adaptation. How 
these distinct needs can be optimized? For example, some contracts encompass relatively 
long-periods of time, such as “lifetime support contracts for certain highly technical 
weapon systems.”217 Such kind of contracts may expose governmental agencies to the 
hazard of asset specificity, even if the contract is competitively bid. In this case the 
governmental agency’s in-house capacity erodes in proportion with reliance on PMCs. 
When the contract has been repeated with the same bidder, this bidder gains a 
comparative advantage over its rivals, and begins to monopolize the provision of this 
highly specific asset. Thus, governments become more and more dependent on PMCs. 
Should this dependence be tolerated? Or should the government specifically clarify 
particular functions as inherently governmental so that governmental agencies keep them 
in-house no matter what the costs are? 
From the PMCs’ perspective, there are two dilemmas. First, should they achieve 
their mission as quickly as possible so that they convince their principals that they are 
more efficient than their rivals, or should they slow the mission down and prolong the 
contract so that they can increase their profit margin? This dilemma stems from the 
mismatch between the incentives of PMCs and the existing contracting procedures of 
principals that punish poor performance. Some scholars believe that PMCs often have 
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incentives to prolong contracts.218 If this is the case, the contradiction for PMCs is that 
even though they seek to extend the contract, since future contracts depends on current 
performance, they have to achieve the goals that are asked for as quickly as possible in 
order to prove their efficacy to their principals. The second dilemma is more significant 
in contingency operations. On the one hand, they have to prove that they are reliable 
partners to governmental agencies and ready to face any challenge to accomplish the 
mission. On the other hand, PMCs have incentives to refrain from undue risks to protect 
their corporate assets.219 While the former is necessary to win the contract, the latter is 
required to keep their human capital at stable levels, which is essential for the company to 
fulfill the requirements of the contract.  
As a result, optimization of these diverse interests in contingency operations is a 
big challenge. Furthermore, contingencies provide PMCs with more leverage than 
governmental agencies. Since monitoring becomes difficult, PMCs often benefit from 
uncertainty to increase their profit margins. Unless this positional asymmetry is 
eradicated by effective oversight mechanisms, governmental agencies are doomed to face 
contractual hazards and their negative consequences. In this regard, the contract is the 
primary tool that governmental agencies can use to manage PMCs. The contract is the 
mandate for a PMC that prescribes what he is required to do and what he is required not 
to do. In this sense, a well-written contract that is flexible enough to allow governmental 
agencies to adapt to new circumstances but detailed enough to exert effective control 
over PMCs is essential for effective oversight. The rest of this chapter will examine the 
existing contracting system in the United States. Scholars often argue that existing 
contracting system does not answer to the contingency needs. The argument is that while 
contracting in contingency operations requires quick response and flexibility but at the 
same time greater control, the existing system largely focuses on efficiency. 
Nevertheless, in contingency operations, rapid delivery of a good or service may 
sometimes be more crucial than cost-efficiency. In this regard, it is essential to adapt the 
existing system in accordance with the requirements of contingency contracting.  
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E. CONTRACTING SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 
The United States Code (U.S.C.), Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the 
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), Department of Defense 
5000 series of acquisition guidance, Department of Defense Regulation 7000.14-R, the 
Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation, and Operational Contracting 
in Joint Operations (Joint Publication 4-10) establish a framework for the contracting 
system.220 These documents clearly maintain that contracting is a continuous process that 
encompasses the contracting cycle as a whole, from contract award to contract closeout. 
Basically, federal procurement laws that regulate contracting procedures require that 
governmental agencies be neutral and fair to all parties.221 Therefore, it is necessary that 
governmental agencies be responsible to pursue open and transparent contracting 
processes. In this regard, there are two dimensions of insuring impartiality: maintaining 
accountability through contracting procedures, and maintaining accountability through 
oversight.222  
In order to maintain accountability through contracting procedures, there are 
national regulations in the United States that ensure accountability, transparency and 
neutrality. For instance, FAR obligates contracting officers to disseminate information 
regarding every contract that is expected to exceed $25,000 so that any qualified firm has 
the opportunity to participate in the bidding.223 Moreover, FAR requires Contracting 
Officers to disseminate basic information via the Internet, such as the type and value of 
the contract and the identity of the winner, for contracts awarded in excess of $25,000.224 
In addition, the Code of Federal Regulation obligates PMCs that seek to work for United 
States government, to meet basic requirements, such as registering in the Central 
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Contractor Registration database, in order to ensure that bidders are “legitimate entities 
with a business bank account, federal tax identification number, and a business 
address.”225  
The United States maintains accountability through various federal laws, 
regulations and oversight mechanisms. For example, the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
requires PMCs to be responsible for performing their work in line with the terms and 
conditions of the contract, obligating the contracting entity to have the main 
responsibility to supervise contracts.226 Contracting officers (CO) and contracting officer 
representatives (COR) are assigned to ensure that PMCs are performing their tasks in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of their contracts. Some social mechanisms 
also maintain accountability through oversight. For instance, other entities that share the 
same area of responsibility, such as local people, local security forces, media, NGOs, and 
other private or formal organizations, have social responsibilities to monitor and report 
fraud, waste and abuse by PMCs. This is generally called as “fire alarming system.” 
Furthermore, various institutional oversight mechanisms such as CRS, GAO, OMB, the 
Army Audit Agency (AAA), Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), SIGIR and 
SIGAR, have significant roles in informing the United States Congress, government and 
public in general, and keeping PMCs accountable.  
The United States has been working on a new contingency contracting system, 
incorporating the basics of the existing system, which is primarily ordered by FAR. 
However, beginning with the global war on terrorism, contracting professionals, scholars, 
and government officials have debated that the current contracting system is not suitable 
for contingency contracting, in which quick response is sometimes more important than 
cost-efficiency.227 In response to changing requirements, the Joint Contingency 
Contracting Policy Workgroup issued a joint handbook on contingency contracting in 
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2008, adapting the contracting requirements of FAR, DFARS and Joint Publication 4-10 
into contingency operations. According to the handbook, the contract monitoring system 
in contingency operations is basically comprised of two components: CO, and COR.228 
Commanders also have the responsibility to coordinate and monitor the efforts of other 
units, organizations, and private entities in a certain area of responsibility; therefore, it is 
meaningful to incorporate them into the monitoring system as an integral part. 
1. Contracting Officer 
The CO is the only person who is authorized to control and manage all aspects of 
contract implementation. No other person or official, even if he is the head of a 
governmental agency, COR, or a military commander, is allowed to direct the execution 
of a contract without the clear approval of the COs.229 COs utilize various tools and 
techniques to make sure that PMCs are executing their missions in accordance with the 
requirements of the contract. These tools include “contract deliverables, program 
reviews, and payment approvals.”230 COs also use a variety of managerial instruments to 
take corrective action when a PMC fails to fulfill the requirements of the contract.231 For 
example, federal regulation authorizes the contracting officer to decide the award of an 
option period.232 The government also has the authority to delay or prohibit a PMC from 
“doing future business with the federal government, hold the contractor responsible for 
the failure to perform, and charge the contractor for any additional costs of 
reperformance.”233 
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2. Contracting Officer’s Representative 
During contingency operations, contracting surveillance by contracting officers 
becomes harder because of continuing military operations and threats associated with 
local instabilities. In this regard, CORs play key roles in contract monitoring and are “the 
last tactical mile” of contingency contract monitoring.234 In this sense, CORs constitute a 
bridge between COs and PMCs. CORs are responsible for monitoring PMCs and 
notifying COs about their performances. Nevertheless, they have no authority to make 
any changes that influence price, time, quality, and quantity of the delivery on the terms 
and conditions of the contract.235 They perform regular and irregular inspections and 
submit performance reports to COs. According to DFARS Subpart 201.6, a COR must be 
a qualified, experienced and trained government employee. Furthermore, the Office of 
Management and Budget memorandum, which was released in November 2007, requires 
that all CORs appointed to a contract must be certified.236 The memorandum states that 
after getting core training and assignment-specific training, CORs qualify to have a 
certificate; however, they are expected to maintain their knowledge and skills through 
continuous learning.237  
3. Military Commanders 
Commanders are also responsible to ensure that all sub-units that share the same 
area of responsibility are working in tandem. Different field manuals and documents 
mention these responsibilities. For instance, the Field Manual on Counterinsurgency, 
which was published in 2006, highlights the significant role that contractors play in 
counterinsurgency operations and states that “at a minimum, commanders should know 
which companies are present in their [area of operation] AO, . . . commanders should 
                                                 
234 Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, 
“Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting,” 43. 
235 United States Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Contingency Contracting: A 
Framework for Reform,” 13. 
236 The Office of Management and Budget, “The Federal Acquisition Certification for Contracting 
Officer Technical Representatives,” OMB Report, November 26, 2007, 2, at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement/memo/fac-cotr.pdf (accessed July 23, 2010). 
237 Ibid. 
 66
identify contractors operating in their AO and determine the nature of their contract, 
existing accountability mechanism, and appropriate coordination relationships.”238 
Similarly, Richard Fontaine testifies that an officer in the battlefield should at least know 
“how many contractors are in a particular battle space, who and where they are, and what 
they are doing; how their responsibilities mesh with the authorities and responsibilities of 
American government personnel; and how operational plans incorporate contractors into 
the array of forces in play.”239 Nevertheless, it is difficult for commanders to fulfill these 
responsibilities, because although they use the same area of responsibility, PMCs operate 
out of their own command structure.  
F. INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS IN THE UNITED STATES 
There are mainly six institutional problems that make supervising PMCs harder. 
The first institutional challenge is associated with doctrinal void and institutional 
misunderstanding of the roles that PMCs play in contingency operations. The hanging of 
four armed contractors working for Blackwater (now Xe) on a bridge in Fallujah in 2004 
taught us that Iraqi insurgents did not see much difference between PMC personnel and 
U.S. military personnel. We came to realize that PMCs play such significant roles in Iraq 
and Afghanistan that unless managed and monitored properly, they may inadvertently 
undermine the United States’ efforts. Current doctrine, however, does not perfectly 
reflect this insight. For example, according to Singer, the fundamental problem with 
monitoring is the absence of a doctrine on how to manage PMCs and how to effectively 
integrate them to the operational plans.240 Abu Ghraib and Nassir Square incidents are in 
a sense reflections of this institutional misconception. Another example of the absence of 
a coherent doctrine is that United States even contracted out the coordination of PMCs in 
contingency operations. In 2004, Aegis Defense Services, which is a United Kingdom-
based PMC, was awarded a three-year contract, which was then renewed in 2007 for two 
years, to coordinate the activities of more than fifty PMCs operating in the Iraq 
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theatre.241 Secretary of Defense Roberts Gates articulates the absence of a comprehensive 
doctrine regarding the utilization of PMCs in contingency operations with those words:  
without any supervision or without any coherent strategy on how we were 
going to do it and without conscious decisions about what we will allow 
contractors to do and what we won’t allow contractors to do . . .We have 
not thought holistically or coherently about our use of contractors, 
particularly when it comes to combat environments or combat training.242  
Thus, it becomes clear that there is an urgent need for institutional realization of 
the importance of supervision with respect to activities of PMCs in contingency 
operations. Moreover, in a contingency operation, it is important that all governmental 
agencies speak the same language. Establishing a doctrine that outlines clear principles 
and guidelines on how to manage and supervise PMCs and that reflects organizational 
understanding of the roles that PMCs play in contingency operations is essential for the 
success of the contingency missions.  
The second institutional challenge is the weaknesses of interagency coordination 
mechanisms in contingency operations. According to Martha Minow, there is a 
significant institutional lacuna that provides PMCs with asymmetrical advantage. She 
states that, “Proceeding with their own agendas, under their own leaders, contractors may 
literally collide with military initiatives, and no coherent coordination of information and 
personnel yet exists to bridge the contractor-military divide.”243 In order to coordinate the 
operations of PMCs in Iraq, Armed Contractor Oversight Division (ACOD) was 
established in 2007. In February 2009, the United States established another ACOD in 
Afghanistan. However, there are ongoing coordination problems, particularly in 
Afghanistan. While ACOD in Iraq is relatively an older organization that is led and 
staffed by DoD personnel, ACOD in Afghanistan is a pretty new organization that is 
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mainly staffed by Aegis contractor personnel.244 Furthermore, the Memorandum of 
Agreement, which was signed in 2007 between the Department of Defense and 
Department of State to coordinate efforts to monitor PMCs, applies only to Iraq.245 There 
is no such agreement in Afghanistan between these two governmental agencies.246 
What makes oversight even much more difficult in contingency operations is the 
shortage of CO and CORs. Even though the reliance on PMCs has increased over the last 
decade, the number of COs and CORs has stayed constant; causing shortages that had 
many unintended consequences on contingency contracts. First, inadequacy of 
contracting officials pushes governmental agencies to award a huge contract to one 
primary PMC at a time.247 Generally, this primary PMC subcontracts other PMCs to 
fulfill the given function. Breaking the contract into pieces and contracting out each piece 
to other agents, the primary PMC indirectly becomes the monitoring mechanism of the 
governmental agency. For example, it is reported that of about sixty known PMCs that 
operate in the Iraq theatre, only eight directly work for the Department of Defense, 
whereas the rest of them are subcontractors.248 This means that the Department of 
Defense, which contracts out one large PMC, inadvertently loses control over 
subcontractors, because subcontractors are not accountable to the DoD, but to the primary 
PMC that employs them. If there were enough procurement personnel, contracts with 
PMCs would be more easily managed and monitored, because rather than subcontracting, 
a huge contract would be divided into smaller contracts, each supervised by at least one 
contracting personnel.249 In addition to loss of control, subcontracting also increases the 
likelihood of fraud and creates inefficiencies on the governmental agencies’ side. Since 
governmental agencies have no control over the subcontracting procedure, they 
sometimes circuitously employ a PMC that they would never employ otherwise. Another 
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complication is that CORs have not been properly assigned to monitor PMCs. A report 
by the Commission on Wartime Contracting indicates that in both Iraq and Afghanistan, 
some of the security CORs had no technical expertise in security.250 The report reveals 
that one security COR in Iraq was a combat medic; another security COR in Afghanistan 
was field artillery.251 Normally CORs are appointed by COs to oversee a number of 
contracts; however, under contingency operations, CORs usually perform their 
monitoring missions in addition to their original job responsibilities.252 A report by the 
Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan reveals that CORs do not 
have sufficient time to supervise their contracts and that they have no motivation to 
achieve their monitoring mission with high performance, since performance assessment 
criteria are based on their primary job responsibilities.253 According to the report, due to 
the insufficiency of acquisition personnel on the ground, CORs are so overloaded with 
work that they cannot monitor their contracts properly.254 Interviews that Commission on 
Warfare Contracting conducted in Afghanistan reveal that in April 2009, one of the 
certified CORs of the Combined Joint Task Force-101 was assigned to monitor fifteen 
contracts simultaneously.255 According to the Commission’s figures, CORs in the 
Afghanistan theatre are responsible for 3.55 contracts on average.256  
The fourth institutional complication is that governmental agencies rarely train 
contracting personnel on how to supervise PMCs and do not normally appoint their best 
employees to oversee contracts.257 The Gansler Report, which was released by the 
Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary 
Operations in 2007, revealed that contracting officer representatives, who are responsible 
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for managing PMCs in contingency operations, have no previous background, interaction 
or experience with contractors and have received little training on managing PMCs on the 
ground.258 It has been articulated by GAO, CRS, the Commission on Wartime 
Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan many times that the government must ensure that 
professionals in the field of acquisition management and contract administration are 
thoroughly trained and properly authorized to manage the challenges of modern 
contracting procedures.259  
Fifth, contingency contracts with PMCs usually involve unclear requirements.260 
According to Singer: “. . . contract terms with PMFs are often unspecific, lacking outside 
standards of achievement and established measures of effectiveness. This leaves the 
principal/client at the mercy of the agent to tell him how well the contract is going and 
what should be done next.”261 In this respect, contracting management is perhaps the 
most important tool to control PMCs. As Bruneau states, “The contract is the vehicle and 
guidance for everything contractors are paid to do. Effectiveness is only as good as the 
contract and the organizational processes used to plan, award, and administer the 
contract.”262 In contingency operations, however, writing a contract with enough clarity 
to facilitate monitoring and management of the activities of PMCs while providing the 
governmental agency with sufficient flexibility to adapt to new circumstances is a 
considerable challenge for COs.  
The last institutional problem concerns managing PMCs on the ground. As the 
number of contractors has increased over the last two decades, military commanders and 
soldiers on the ground have increasingly begun to cooperate and interact with PMCs. 
Aligning PMCs with the military has posed new challenges on control and command in 
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the battlefield. A report issued by the CRS in 2008 expresses that a number of military 
commanders and service members lacked “adequate information regarding the extent of 
contractor support in Iraq” and “did not receive enough pre-deployment training about 
managing contractors.”263 In this regard, managing PMCs necessitates well-trained 
military officers that have critical knowledge and skills regarding PMCs. 
G. STEPS TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT ANG MANAGEMENT 
1. Developing a Comprehensive Doctrine 
Doctrines are written to codify general principles. They reflect institutional 
insight about a particular issue. Institutions use doctrines as tools to provide their 
members with their institutional perspective on a specific subject. However, at the center 
of any institution are human. Doctrines do very little unless members of institutions 
embrace and apply these doctrines into their daily tasks. In this sense, the presence of a 
well-written doctrine is not sufficient for better institutional understanding, and does not 
guarantee higher performance. Therefore, the challenge for institutions is to write a living 
doctrine that answers to the needs of their members.  
The Gansler report states that an urgent need is required to develop a 
comprehensive doctrine that incorporates true understanding of the roles that contractors 
play in contingency operations in the military culture.264 Unquestionably, this new 
doctrine should answer to the needs of contingency operations.265 First, it should address 
the problems associated with inherently governmental functions. In this context, new 
doctrine should put an end to confusion about the definition of inherently governmental 
functions, clarifying which functions are inherently governmental, which functions are 
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related to inherently governmental, and which functions are commercial.266 Second, it 
should also establish a comprehensive framework for contingency contracting procedures 
that are required to respond to current contingency demands: simplified but effective 
procedures, clear requirements and specific standards that can easily be measured, clear 
lines of authorities, and larger number of professional COs and CORs. Last, it should 
incorporate PMCs into military operations in contingency operations, clarifying their 
position in the larger military command structure.  
In this sense, the United States has been working on establishing a new doctrine 
that tries to incorporate PMCs into military operations since 2007. For instance, in 2008, 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued Joint Publication 4-10 Operational 
Contract Support, which provides a doctrine for contractor management and support 
during contingency operations.267 In 2009, Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn 
released a detailed directive that points to specific responsibilities within the Department 
of Defense regarding contract management, contract oversight, managing contractors in 
the battlefield, developing policy, providing guidance, and incorporating contractors into 
contingency operations.268 In July 2009, the Department of Defense published an 
instruction setting rules, policies and procedures for managing PMCs during contingency 
operations.269 Following the instruction released by DoD, a task force on wartime 
contracting was established under Secretary Ashton Carter.270 The task force is 
comprised of members from the Joint Contracting Command, Joint Staff, military 
services, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.271 The Department of Defense 
assigned an oversight mission to the task force. The task force is now establishing what 
the proper roles are that contractors may play in contingency operations.272 According to 
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the Department of Defense, findings of the task force will not only reshape the existing 
doctrine, but also help officials to determine which roles can be assigned to them and 
what should be the actual size of contractor workforce in contingency operations.273 In 
order to provide commanders, CCOs and CORs with vital information regarding 
contingency contracting, Department of Defense Office of Inspector General published a 
report in May 2010. DoD officials state that many doctrinal changes are still 
underway.274 They assert that incorporating PMCs into military culture requires diligence 
and patience.275 DoD estimates that it may take three years to update the current policies, 
integrate PMCs into military operations, and complete training.276  
2. Creating an Institutional Memory 
In order to decide whether PMCs are properly monitored, credible and meaningful 
data are essential.277 Without reliable and sufficient information, it is impossible to make 
a statistical analysis for future projections regarding how to use PMCs more effectively in 
contingency operations. Furthermore, incomplete and inaccurate data on PMCs 
supporting stabilization and reconstruction campaigns may hamper planning and increase 
costs and risks. First, without accurate data, agencies cannot be sure how extensively they 
rely on contractors in carrying out their missions.278 Second, without incorporating 
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missions.279 Third, insufficient or wrong financial information on contracts can inhibit 
the creation of realistic budgets.280 Finally, lack of insight may increase the likelihood of 
paying for duplicative services.281 
In order to eliminate the negatives that stem from inaccurate and insufficient 
information about contractors, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the 
USAID signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) about procedures for contracting 
in Iraq and Afghanistan as stated in Section 861 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act (NDAA) for FY2008. They created a system of record with regard to contract and 
contractor personnel information called the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational 
Tracker (SPOT).  
The NDAA for FY2008 required the databases to track at a minimum:  
 • for each contract,  
  a brief description of the contract,  
  its total value, and  
  whether it was awarded competitively, and  
 • for contractor personnel working under contracts in Iraq or Afghanistan,  
  total number employed,  
  total number performing security functions, and  
  total number who have been killed or wounded.282 
In this context, contracts with at least 14 days of duration in Iraq or Afghanistan, 
or valued more than $100,000, would be entered into the SPOT, along with their 
personnel data. Elements, such as value and extent of competition, would be taken from 
the federal government’s system of record on contracting, the Federal Procurement Data 
System – Next Generation (FPDS-NG), and added to the SPOT.  
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Previously, accessing required contracts and contractor personnel data was 
impeded due to some physical and methodological reasons. Particularly, data on contracts 
and contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan was kept with the contractors, hoarded 
in multifarious data systems, or existed as hard copies in separate geographical regions. 
According to DoD, State and USAID officials, the use of SPOT has the potential to 
accumulate this scattered information to better regulate and supervise contractors. 
The primary factor for deciding to enter contractor personnel into SPOT was 
whether a contractor needed a SPOT- generated letter of authorization (LOA). An LOA is 
an official document issued by a contracting officer to allow contractors to travel to, 
from, and within a designated area. It also identifies the privileges that the contractor has 
under the contract. Contractors need LOAs “to enter Iraq, receive military identification 
cards, travel on U.S. military aircraft, or, for security contractors, receive approval to 
carry weapons.”283 However, local nationals in Iraq do not need LOAs and so they are 
not entered into SPOT. Moreover, the number of local nationals is inclined to fluctuate 
since most of them work on a daily basis, so are not always recorded by their contractors. 
Therefore, SPOT does not reflect the true number of local contractor personnel working 
in Iraq. In this respect, the SPOT system should be improved in a way that reveals more 
accurate data. The United States governmental agencies should address and coordinate 
issues regarding the entering local nationals and subcontractors into the SPOT because 
credible and meaningful data is essential for effective oversight and management. 
3. Creating an Open, Transparent and Competitive Market 
There remain concerns about openness, transparency, and competency of the 
market in which PMCs operate. Although federal regulations on contracting promote 
neutral, competitive, open and transparent procedures, data indicates the opposite. For 
example, the testimony of David M. Walker points out that only 41 percent of DoD 
contracts in FY2005 were awarded through full competition.284 Corruption is the natural 
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consequence of any contract awarded without competition. Waste and fraud usually 
happen where institutional weaknesses are evident. In this regard, institutions play a key 
role in creating a competitive market that favors the principal.  
From the principal’s perspective, competition is required to minimize the costs, to 
prevent financial waste, to improve quality, and to encourage innovation. From the 
agent’s perspective, competition is necessary to increase productivity and efficiency in 
the sector. However, PMCs often have incentives to eradicate competitiveness in order to 
gain a comparative advantage over their principals. Monopolization of certain services by 
several PMCs poses a serious jeopardy to competitiveness. As Martha Minow states, 
“When the government is the sole purchaser, a handful of contractors dominating the 
field often enjoys the power that undermines market efficiency and contractual 
accountability.”285 Enjoying the advantages that the monopoly provided, PMCs can use 
their bargaining power to exploit the government by simply determining the range of 
prices, the terms of contracts, and the way of conduct. For instance, the Halliburton 
Company was awarded the two largest contracts during OIF without competitive bidding, 
because there was simply no other option capable of providing the same services in the 
same scope and of the same quality.286 Unless a competitive market discipline is 
established together with effective government oversight, PMCs can evade accountability 
without facing any difficulty. 
Due largely to security considerations, Department of Defense contracts are 
mostly awarded to United States-based PMCs. The logic here is that awarding contracts 
to United States-based PMCs with great experience and successful past performance 
would not only strengthen the control arm of the state, but also economically benefit the 
internal private security market, making it stronger and more competitive than other 
markets. This implication may protect vital interests of the United States both at home 
and abroad, but it also puts some limitations on outsourcing, negatively affecting the 
competitiveness of the market. In some situations, such restrictions on conditions of 
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outsourcing may leave governmental agencies with unqualified or insufficient numbers of 
agents. Governmental agencies may come up against a contracting procedure in which 
the winner is predetermined. This is generally the case with PMCs that have strong ties 
with the United States government. Blackwater, Halliburton, KBR, MPRI, and Dyncorp, 
which have become highly specialized on certain goods and services over time, have 
dominated the market in the United States and become an oligopoly. Considering the 
extent of U.S. strategic objectives and that the requirements and restrictions on 
outsourcing benefit large United States-based corporations with strong ties, other PMCs 
in the market are placed in a disadvantageous position. Although some of these small 
PMCs are awarded subcontracts in Iraq and Afghanistan by bigger PMCs that constitute 
the oligopoly in the market, most of them have typically been awarded relatively small 
contracts at home, which provide comparatively lower profit margins. Therefore, the 
current system of contracting in the United States rewards big local corporations, while 
punishing small local corporations and PMCs based outside the United States. As Singer 
states, “such arrangements forget that the efficiency of privatization comes from greater 
competition, rather than simply that it is private.”287  
Contrary to the common assumption that the private military industry is a very 
lucrative business, some scholars claim that it is not. For instance, Dew and Hudgens’ 
analysis shows that the private military industry is not as remunerative as expected.288 
They note that competition for contracts is so high that sometimes contracts leave no 
margin for profit.289 They claim that much of the revenue is allocated to inside 
stakeholders (employees) who have a strong bargaining power in the competitive sector, 
leaving small margins of profit for the outside stakeholders and suppliers, who rely 
largely on the human capital of their employees.290 Their findings make sense for 
markets where institutions are powerful to ensure competitiveness. However, their  
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findings are apparently not valid for markets that are dominated by institutional 
weaknesses and corruption. This is particularly the case in failed states, which host 
contingency operations within their territories.  
If there are institutional mechanisms that are capable of guaranteeing a 
competitive market, principals enjoy such benefits as cost efficiency and greater control. 
On the other hand, the contracts awarded without competition always run the risk of 
overcharge and fraud. Predictably, markets in the United States would produce better 
outcomes for the public, whereas markets in Iraq and Afghanistan would generate 
relatively poorer outcomes. This is largely because the market in the United States is 
better regulated than both that of Iraq and that of Afghanistan. In this sense, 
contingencies are risky and uncertain environments that negatively affect the 
competitiveness of the market. When there are only a couple of PMCs qualified to 
provide a particular service under highly unpredictable and complex circumstances, 
contracts usually leave these PMCs huge margins of profit.   
As discussed in the previous chapter, markets create their own dynamics. All 
participants continuously shape the market, affecting the way it works. Governmental 
agencies, which are the clients of the market, and PMCs, which are the sellers of various 
goods and services to their clients, have a direct impact on the way the market works. 
Governmental agencies put restrictions on the conduct, and determine the time, quantity, 
and quality of the delivery. On the other hand, in order to win the contract, PMCs, 
compete with each other to provide the goods or services that the client demands at 
minimum cost. Besides the effects on competitiveness, and the effectiveness and 
efficiency of firms, markets also influence the way firms operate, affecting the behavior 
of PMCs. If structural mechanisms promote successful PMCs with a clean past and high 
performance, other PMCs would begin to adopt similar principles and norms. If 
reputation becomes an important consideration, PMCs begin to follow more transparent 
methods. In this sense, markets, if open, transparent and competitive, begin to regulate 
PMCs, pushing them to follow more humanitarian techniques and tactics.  
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4. Strengthening Interagency Coordination Mechanisms 
The presence of an interagency coordination mechanism in a contingency 
operation that is authorized monitor and report the activities of the government’s de facto 
agents would likely to increase control over PMCs. Moreover, such mechanisms would 
not only deter PMCs from shirking and breaching laws and norms, but also increase 
effectiveness and efficiencies of governmental agencies. Thus far, the Department of 
Defense created Contractor Operations Cells in Iraq and Afghanistan to coordinate the 
activities of PMCs.291 Furthermore; the DoD established the Army Contractor Oversight 
Directorate and charged it with the task of the investigation of the use of force by PMCs 
and the development of policies in this regard.292 A report issued by SIGIR in July 2009, 
states that recent institutional and procedural adjustments such as the memorandum of 
agreement (MOA) between Department of Defense and Department of State and the 
creation of ACOD, have improved the control and coordination of PMCs’ activities in 
Iraq.293 However, governmental agencies have less control over PMCs in Afghanistan, 
since ACOD in Afghanistan is relatively a new organization, which is currently trying to 
evolve into a more mature institution. Furthermore, unlike ACOD in Iraq, whose 
personnel are mostly the government officials; most of the staff of ACOD in Afghanistan 
is comprised of contractors, rather than government officials. These shortcomings lead to 
inefficiencies on the part of governmental agencies that hire PMCs. These weaknesses 
should be eliminated, and interagency coordination mechanisms should be strengthened. 
In this regard, first and foremost, the current problems within SPOT should be solved. 
Control over PMCs in a contingency operation is only as good as the information upon 
which interagency coordination mechanisms rely. Second, the function of coordination of 
PMCs should not be outsourced to PMCs. Hiring a PMC for supervision of other PMCs 
would not only provide this company with unfair competition leverage, but would also 
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undermine the government’s direct control over activities of PMCs in contingency 
operations. Last, interagency coordination mechanisms should cooperate with the local 
government to increase the quality of regulation.  
5. Increasing the Quality and Quantity of Contracting Professionals 
The report of Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan states 
that the level of need for CORs changes in line with the complexity of the contract: while 
expensive service contracts with a broad scope that requires a considerable technical and 
scientific proficiency may necessitate full-time CORs, single-service contracts with a 
short period and a low dollar-value may obligate no COR monitoring.294 Keeping these 
different needs in mind, the United States should estimate the actual required capacity to 
better monitor contracts with PMCs in contingency operations. Presumably, greater 
number of CORs and COs would lead to better contract management and less financial 
and conduct related abuses, but only if they are properly trained to monitor and manage 
PMCs during contingencies. The United States should also provide their contracting 
personnel with adequate pre-deployment training and ongoing contingency contracting 
training. These measures would bring about greater control, less fraud and more 
efficiency on the part of governmental agencies, while preventing and deterring PMCs 
from shirking.  
Officials state that the Department of Defense already began to improve the 
workforce acquisition numbers in Iraq and Afghanistan.295 In May 2009, the Secretary of 
Defense issued a plan that will gradually increase the size of the acquisition 
workforce.296 In accordance with this plan, Department of Defense officials expect the 
acquisition workforce to gain 20,000 contracting professionals by 2015.297 If this plan  
 
 
                                                 
294 Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, “At what Cost? Contingency 





materializes, the oversight arm of the Department of Defense may gain strength and 
existing monitoring problems with respect to insufficiency of contracting professionals 
may be largely resolved. 
6. Training Commanders and Clarifying Authorities 
Military officers on the ground often do not know whether and how they can 
control PMCs. Furthermore; commanders are confused about where their authority over 
private military personnel begins and ends. By and large, this confusion stems from an 
incompatible blend of authorities and responsibilities that manage PMCs in contingency 
operations. Private military personnel mainly operate under two different authorities in 
contingencies: the authority of their civilian supervisors, and the authority of the 
commander whom they support. On the one hand, the incorporation of private military 
personnel into the military structure requires private military personnel to follow the 
orders of the military commanders. On the other hand, private military personnel are 
hired and fired by their civilian superiors. This tension creates vague lines of authority 
with respect to who really have the right to manage them. Moreover, PMCs are generally 
expected to conform to the same general rules and procedures as militaries, but there are 
times they do not. Although contractors are subject to the same laws as military 
personnel, conventional wisdom says that in comparison to military personnel, private 
military personnel is more likely to be exempt from prosecution. As Minow states, “Even 
if the lines of authority clearly locate the civilian contractor employees under military 
command, these civilians do not face the same rewards and sanctions as do the members 
of the military, including military culture and command structure.”298 In 2007, the U.S. 
Congress extended the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to encompass the 
employees of PMCs that accompany the U.S. military in contingency operations. 
According to Senator Lindsey Graham, this modification of the UCMJ would be helpful 
in terms of facilitating commanding contractors by providing commanders on the ground 
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with “a more fair and efficient means of discipline” during contingency operations.299 
However, expansion of the UCMJ has raised many issues; the most critical of which is 
whether it is appropriate to expose civilian contractors to the military justice system. 
Another issue that scholars often raise is whether the U.S. Congress has the authority to 
order the prosecution of civilians under military discipline. If we consider the answers to 
the previous issues as positive, who would be responsible to prosecute them? What will 
happen if the principal deliberately overlooks contractors’ breaching of law? Finally, 
would civilian contractors also be subject to the articles in regard to command structure 
and military honor? Thus, confusion remains.  
A Congressional Research Service Report published in July 2010, states that in 
response to findings of the Gansler Report, the Department of Defense has taken many 
steps to improve the training level of uniformed personnel that are assigned to supervise 
PMCs in contingency operations.300 The report notes that the Department of Defense is 
already working on an online course that provides military personnel with pre-
deployment training with respect to the management of contractors during military 
operations.301 Furthermore, it reports that the Department of Defense intends to 
incorporate courses regarding contract support into the training process of non-
acquisition personnel, and the United States Army continues to develop instructive 
handbooks in order to assist military personnel in learning how to better coordinate and 
work with PMCs in contingencies.302 Even though DoD has taken some steps to improve 
the level of training of its military personnel, additional actions are needed to address 
remaining concerns.303 
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In order to better supervise PMCs, in addition to exposing military personnel to 
proper and adequate training prior to deployment, ongoing training that follows 
predeployment training is essential to keep military personnel updated. This training 
should be repeated on a regular basis during the deployment period. Importantly, they 
should be given clear instructions on how to manage private military personnel on the 
ground. Governmental agencies should obligate PMCs that work for the United States 
government in contingency operations, to train their personnel on these issues as well. 
Private military personnel should also be given clear instructions as to who has the 
authority to manage them during their missions. They should be warned about possible 
consequences of their misconduct or disobedience. The United States should punish 
perpetrators as necessary to signal that breaches by private military personnel will not be 
tolerated. 
7. Continuing to Use the Licensing System 
In order to protect its national interests in contingency operations, the U.S. has 
been using a licensing system to regulate PMCs in Iraq and Afghanistan under the U.S. 
Arms Export Control Act, which “provides the authority to control the export of defense 
articles and services.”304 PMCs, which are located in the United States but offer military 
advice to foreign nationals in contingency operations, are obliged to register with, and get 
a license from, the Department of State “under the International Transfer of Arms 
Regulations (ITAR), which implement the Arms Export Control Act.”305 The licensing 
system is an effective tool to push PMCs to embrace similar international norms and 
standards. In this regard, while directly managing PMCs with contracts, the United States 
should also increase the standards required to obtain a license. Furthermore, the United 
States should monitor PMCs that are registered in the United States but operate in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, even if they work independently from the United States government, 
and cancel the licenses of PMCs whose misconduct is proven. 
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IV. REGULATING PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 
A. BACKGROUND 
In this chapter, some underlying problems regarding regulating PMCs in 
contingency operations will be examined to better understand how the current regulatory 
framework exempts private military personnel from prosecution in some cases. It will be 
discussed how PMCs may undermine stabilization and reconstruction efforts when they 
are not regulated properly.  
Today, some scholars see PMCs as a crucial part of the U.S. strategy in Iraq and 
Afghanistan; however, others worry about their possible negative influences on the 
United States’ stabilization and reconstruction efforts.306 Jennifer K. Elsea articulates 
these concerns as follows, “Due to a spate of high-profile incidents involving contractors 
allegedly shooting civilians, using excessive force, committing other crimes, or otherwise 
behaving in a manner that may be offensive to the local population, there is concern that 
the reliance on contractors may be undermining U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.”307 In the last decade, transparency and accountability of PMCs, and 
the problematic legal framework in which they operate, have been debated at length in 
various reports published by the CBO, GAO, and CRS, as well as in books, articles and 
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journals written by different scholars, analysts, and contract law specialists.308 Some 
scholars, such as Jennifer K. Elsea, Michael John Garcia, R. Chuck Mason, Jackson 
Nyamuya Maogoto, Benedict Sheehy, Doug Brooks, Marina Caparini, Mosche Schwartz, 
Marc Lindemann, and Kennon H. Nakamura, examined which laws regulate PMCs in 
armed conflicts, as utilization of PMCs by states, and international and regional 
organizations has increased dramatically. 
Though their opinions about which functions should be carried out by PMCs or 
how PMCs should be monitored and managed differs more or less, scholars generally 
agree that the problematic legal framework in which PMCs operate poses many 
challenges in terms of their use in contingency operations, since the current regulatory 
framework exempts private military personnel from prosecution in particular cases. On 
the one hand, there are international laws that establish a vague framework but are not 
useful for defining the current activities and roles of PMCs in contingency operations. On 
the other hand, there are national laws, which are unable to regulate PMCs effectively, 
either because of insufficient capacity or political unwillingness. In this sense, the 
enforcement problem of international law, insufficient capacities of Iraq and Afghanistan, 
and political unwillingness of the United States, coupled with the highly changing 
characteristic of contingency environments, provide PMCs with considerable flexibility 
in terms of their legal obligations and practices. 
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Some scholars claim that PMCs generally carry out tasks defensive in nature, so 
there should be no concern that they may damage stabilization and reconstruction efforts 
in contingency operations. International humanitarian law, however, does not distinguish 
between offensive and defensive operations.309 What is important, as a matter of 
international law, is whether or not there is direct participation in hostilities. From this 
perspective, it is obvious that PMCs may face situations in which they have to use force, 
even if they are hired to perform static security tasks such as base security or building 
security.310 Defensive operations do not necessarily mean that PMCs will never 
participate in direct hostilities. Furthermore, since they frequently work in close 
proximity to military personnel, they may be the victims of collateral damage, even if 
they do not carry weapons or use force.311 It is even more difficult to determine which 
functions are defensive and which are offensive in contingency operations where the line 
between service missions and combat missions often blurs. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, 
private military personnel, who mostly execute service missions, have become as 
vulnerable as military personnel who perform combat operations. Moreover, some PMCs 
have performed missions that were previously executed only by lawful combatants.312 
While executing these tasks, many PMC personnel have faced situations that compelled 
them to use force in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Today, it is difficult to consider any military 
or private military missions independent of each other because the complexity of the 
operational environment has led private military missions to overlap with military 
missions.  
Many of the complications regarding prosecution of private military personnel 
stem from their murky legal status under international humanitarian law. International 
humanitarian law does not provide PMCs themselves with a status, but it does so for their 
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staff.313 However, even though personnel of PMCs have a status under international 
humanitarian law, their status may change depending on the nature of their contract and 
of the functions they carry out.314 This complication requires that their status be 
determined on a case-by-case basis.315 For example, according to the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, Blackwater employees, who were killed and hanged on a bridge in Fallujah 
in 2004, were not non-combatants, since they were carrying weapons.316 On the other 
hand, they were not lawful combatants under the Third Geneva Convention, as they were 
not wearing uniforms and did not have an organic tie to the command structure of the 
military.317 According to international law, they were not mercenaries either, because 
mercenaries are defined as combatants whose country is not a party to the conflict and 
who fight for a foreign government.318 Similarly, in 2003, guerillas kidnapped three 
contractor personnel working for California Microwave Systems after their airplane 
crashed in Colombia. Although hired by the United States Navy, they were not treated as 
prisoners-of-war because the Geneva Conventions exempted them from the rights of 
lawful combatants.319  
The International Community of the Red Cross (ICRC) embarked on a new 
initiative to remind states and PMCs of their existing legal responsibilities. Thanks to 
constructive efforts of Switzerland’s government and the ICRC, the Montreux Document 
was signed in October 2009 by seventeen countries that widely deal with PMCs as either 
contracting states, territorial states or home states, to develop “best practices” with regard 
to the proper use of PMCs. For now, the Montreux Document appears to be the only 
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international document that covers PMCs.320 It is the most comprehensive and promising 
attempt to regulate PMCs at the international level so far; however, it is not a binding, but 
a recommendatory document. As a result, enforcement is still a considerable challenge in 
terms of international law, since there is no overarching authority in the international 
system; therefore, we have nothing to rely on but national laws to regulate PMCs.  
The United States’ past experiences with PMCs in Iraq and Afghanistan point out 
the various challenges and complexities of prosecuting PMC personnel in certain 
situations. Currently, private military personnel, who accompany United States military 
overseas, are subject to either the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) or the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), depending on the nature of their crime or 
violation.321 Since PMCs perform a wide variety of functions under different conditions 
and circumstances, it is unclear in which category private military personnel should be 
assessed. Scholars and law specialists suggest that rather than applying a static and 
general regulatory framework to cover all PMC personnel regardless of their nature of 
contracts, incidents in which private military personnel participated should be taken into 
consideration on a case-by-case basis to determine which law applies. Although an 
extension of the UCMJ in 2007 to cover contractors accompanying the United States 
military in contingency operations has facilitated the prosecution of private military 
personnel for certain crimes, application of the UCMJ still looks problematic.  
This chapter will examine major international conventions and documents, and 
domestic laws in the United States, Iraq and Afghanistan that regulate PMCs in 
contingency operations to better understand the challenges of keeping PMCs accountable. 
It will be discussed that states still have non-transferable obligations, even if they 
delegate their authority by contracting with a PMC, and states may lose control over 
PMCs if they do not use effective punishment mechanisms.  
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B. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
According to a 2009 CRS report, United States contractors in Iraq and 
Afghanistan operate under three levels of regulation: international laws, the United States 
law, and the domestic laws of host countries.322  
1. International Law 
a. Geneva Conventions 
The question of whether staffs of PMCs are civilians or combatants is 
central to the regulation of PMCs, since international humanitarian law applies to each 
status differently. If they have a combatant status, they may be targeted in an armed 
conflict and thus are entitled to the rights of lawful combatant status.323 On the other 
hand, if they have a civilian status, then other parties cannot attack them. If they directly 
participate in hostilities despite their civilian status, they lose their immunity from being 
targeted, and if they are captured, they are not entitled to prisoner-of-war status.324 
The Geneva Conventions, which are the only globally accepted laws 
regarding mercenaries, defines private military personnel as “noncombatant personnel 
who accompany combatant forces.”325 The Third Geneva Convention provides civilian 
personnel accompanying the armed forces with a prisoner-of-war status. According to 
Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention: 
Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members 
thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war 
correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or of services 
responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have 
received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who 
shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the 
annexed model.326 
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The abovementioned personnel are not combatants but will be treated as 
prisoners of war upon capture. Unquestionably, the staffs of PMCs that accompany the 
United States military in Iraq and Afghanistan to carry out support functions fall within 
this category.327 Nevertheless, it appears that personnel of PMCs that are working for the 
United States military in these countries to execute combat related tasks, for which they 
have to carry weapons and are likely to use force, do not fall within this category.328    
Another important question that must be addressed to better comprehend 
the position of PMCs in terms of international law is whether the staffs of PMCs are 
mercenaries or lawful combatants. This question is significant, since international law 
provides mercenaries and lawful combatants with different statuses, different obligations, 
and different rights. While international law give the members of armed forces of states 
the right of taking part in hostilities in an armed conflict and the right to be treated as 
prisoners-of-war, it does not allow mercenaries to participate in hostilities directly, and 
deprives mercenaries of the benefits of being treated as prisoners-of-war.329 However, 
this does not mean that international law does not protect mercenaries.330 The Fourth 
Geneva Convention protects mercenaries, like all other civilians in an armed conflict, 
obligating all parties to the conflict to treat mercenaries humanely, and requiring the 
protection of minimum humanitarian and judicial rights once they are captured.331  
At that point, how mercenaries are conceptualized by international law is 
essential to drawing the distinction between different statuses of mercenaries and lawful 
combatants. Article 47 of Additional Protocol to Geneva Conventions presents the 
following definition of mercenaries: 
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1. A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a 
prisoner of war.  
2. A mercenary is any person who:  
(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in 
an armed conflict;  
(b) Does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;  
(c) Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the 
desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party 
to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that 
promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the 
armed forces of that Party;  
(d) Is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident 
of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;  
(e) Is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the 
conflict; and  
(f) Has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the 
conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.332 
The abovementioned definition of mercenaries establishes six clear criteria 
for determining whether or not a particular person is a mercenary. Now, let us turn to our 
primary question: Are the staffs of PMCs mercenaries or are they lawful combatants? 
The answer to this question is not an easy one, since personnel of PMCs perform 
different tasks under different mandates in contingency operations. While some of them 
work directly for governmental agencies, others are doing their business independent of 
contracting or territorial states. Some personnel are directly contracted by states, whereas 
others are subcontractors of another PMC, which directly works for a contracting state, 
territorial state, or a home state. There are also third party countries, international and 
regional organizations, NGOs, and private corporations that hire PMCs to carry out 
certain tasks. Some carry weapons and wear distinctive uniforms, while others simply 
look like civilian personnel. Therefore, given the six aforementioned criteria, it is quite 
difficult to decide whether or not PMCs are mercenaries because not all private military 
personnel fall specifically into the area that is described by Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions. There are chiefly three reasons. First, locals, who make up a significant 
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portion of the total workforce of PMC, constitute a party to the conflict.333 For example, 
as of September 2009, local nationals comprised about 90 percent of the total armed 
security contractors in Afghanistan.334 Second, most of them do not directly take part in 
hostilities.335 According to a CRS report, as of September 2009, while armed private 
security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan constituted 10 percent of all contractors, they 
comprised only 5 percent of the Department of Defense’s workforce.336 The rest were 
basically not carrying weapons while performing their missions and mostly employed to 
execute logistical tasks, life support functions, or basic reconstruction works. Finally, 
since all the criteria must be satisfied in order to name an entity as a mercenary, it is quite 
problematic to decide whether or not a particular contractor is a mercenary under the 
Article 47 of the Geneva Conventions. 
Mercenarism is defined and prohibited by two primary laws: The 
Convention for Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, and The U.N. International 
Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries. The 
former is a regional attempt to prevent mercenary activity, while the latter is an 
international attempt. According to Article 1 of The Convention for Elimination of 
Mercenarism in Africa: 
1. The crime of mercenarism is committed by the individual, group, or 
association, representatives of a State and the State itself with the aim of 
opposing by armed violence a process of self-determination or the 
territorial integrity of another State that practices any of the following 
acts: 
 a) Shelters, organizes, finances, assists, equips, trains, promotes 
supports or in any manner employs armed forces partially or wholly 
consisting of persons who are not nationals of the country where they are 
going to act, for personal gain, material or otherwise; 
 b) Enlists, enrolls or tries to enroll in the said forces; 
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 c) Allows the activities mentioned in paragraph (a) to be carried 
out in any territory under its jurisdiction, or in any place under its control, 
or affords facilities for transit, transport, or other operations of the 
abovementioned forces. 
2.  Any person, natural or juridical who commits the crime of mercenarism 
as defined in paragraph 1 of this Article commits an offence considered as 
a crime against peace and security in Africa and shall be punished as 
such.337 
 
 The mercenary definition of the Convention for Elimination of 
Mercenarism in Africa is similar to that of Article 47 of Additional Protocol of Geneva 
Conventions. The convention prohibits its nationals from mercenary activity; however, 
the enforcement mechanism of the convention does not work properly and is incapable of 
punishing mercenaries particularly operating abroad.  
  Article 1 of The U.N. International Convention Against the Recruitment, 
Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries defines mercenaries as follows: 
1. A mercenary is any person who: 
(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in 
an armed conflict; 
(b) Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the 
desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party 
to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that 
promised or paid to combatants of similar rank and functions in the armed 
forces of that party; 
(c) Is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident 
of territory controlled by a party to the conflict; 
(d) Is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the 
conflict; and 
(e) Has not been sent by a State, which is not a party to the 
conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces. 
2. A mercenary is also any person who, in any other situation: 
(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of 
participating in a concerted act of violence aimed at: 
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       (i) Overthrowing a Government or otherwise 
undermining the constitutional order of a State; or 
 (ii)  Undermining the territorial integrity of a State; 
(b) Is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire for 
significant private gain and is prompted by the promise or payment of 
material compensation; 
(c) Is neither a national nor a resident of the State against 
which such an act is directed; 
(d) Has not been sent by a State on official duty; and 
(e) Is not a member of the armed forces of the State on whose 
territory the act is undertaken.338 
The mercenary definition of The U.N. International Convention Against 
the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries is taken from the Geneva 
Conventions and expanded by adding a few sentences to restrict the utilization of PMCs 
in weak states for the purpose of overthrowing a government or weakening the unity of a 
State. According to Article 5 of the convention: 
 
1.   States Parties shall not recruit, use, finance or train mercenaries and 
shall prohibit such activities in accordance with the provisions of the 
present Convention. 
2.   States Parties shall not recruit, use, finance or train mercenaries for the 
purpose of opposing the legitimate exercise of the inalienable right of 
peoples to self-determination, as recognized by international law, and shall 
take, in conformity with international law, the appropriate measures to 
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The U.N. International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, 
Financing and Training of Mercenaries prohibits the recruitment, use, financing and 
training of mercenaries; however, there is also no monitoring or enforcement mechanism, 
so the application and implication rely on individual member states.340 
b. The Montreux Document 
The U.S. and sixteen other countries, including Iraq and Afghanistan, 
signed the Montreux Document on October 8, 2009 to develop “best practices” regarding 
the utilization of PMCs.341 Even though the Montreux Document is not a legally binding 
instrument, it provides a rather comprehensive and useful framework for regulating 
PMCs in contingency operations. It not only “provides states with good practices,” but 
also promotes “compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights law 
during armed conflict.”342 In short the document requires contracting states to be 
responsible under international law and not to contract out certain functions.343 The 
document also lists responsibilities of territorial states, home states, and PMCs 
themselves, and recommends proper practices to them.  
Part one of the document recalls pertinent international legal obligations 
and responsibilities of relevant states and PMCs themselves. It highlights that contracting 
states have non-transferable responsibilities; therefore, their obligations remain under 
international law, even if they hire PMCs to perform functions that belong to the state 
itself.344 The document reminds States that international law prohibits contracting 
inherently governmental functions out, like “supervision of prisoner-of-war camps and 
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civilian places of internment.”345 According to the document, states should decide which 
services are inherently governmental and which services are commercial, taking into 
consideration whether outsourcing a particular service would lead the PMC to take part 
directly in hostilities.346 The Geneva Convention obligates states not only to abstain from 
committing human rights crimes and violations, but also to take all precautions in their 
power to prevent their de facto agents, like PMCs, to conduct such abuses.347 Elsea 
summarizes the non-transferable responsibilities of states that are mentioned in the 
second part of the document as follows: 
Further, contracting states are obligated to ensure that contractors are 
aware of their obligations and trained accordingly; to take appropriate 
measures to prevent any violations of international humanitarian law by 
private military and security company personnel; to adopt appropriate 
military regulations, administrative orders or other regulatory measures as 
well as administrative, disciplinary or judicial sanctions, as appropriate; to 
prevent, investigate and provide effective remedies for relevant 
misconduct of private military and security companies and their personnel; 
and to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions 
for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other crimes in 
violation of international law, and to pursue prosecutions in case of such a 
breach or permit the host country or an international tribunal to do so.348 
Part two of the document lists some good practices with respect to PMCs. 
The Montreux Document maintains that contracting states have the power to influence 
how PMCs perform their missions in the field.349 In this respect, states should establish 
transparent and supervised contracting procedures;350 adopt selection criteria that force 
PMCs and their subcontractors to obey international norms;351 set prerequisites, such as 
possession of necessary authorizations, sufficient training regarding human rights law, 
legal and proper use of weapons and equipment, satisfactory internal policies, employee 
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and property records, and clean history of past conduct to ensure that PMCs working for 
States meet basic requirements;352 require PMC personnel to wear identifiable uniforms 
that are quite distinct from militaries when executing their missions;353 monitor 
compliance of PMCs to contracts and maintain accountability of PMCs.354 
The United States and other countries that widely use PMCs may use the 
Montreux Document as a guide to regulate PMCs. The document is also applicable to 
home states and territorial states such as Iraq and Afghanistan. These states may use the 
document as an instrument to establish effective control over PMCs. It also recalls that 
employees of PMCs are bound by international humanitarian law, human rights law, and 
other international documents; hence, they should adhere to international norms 
regardless of their status, particularly during armed conflicts.  
After examining international documents and conventions, next we will 
turn to relevant national laws. According to Brooks and Chorev, “it is the ultimate 
responsibility of states to write laws, carry out criminal proceedings, make policies and 
draw the ethical boundary lines that need to be drawn.”355 Keeping that in mind, the rest 
of the chapter will seek to find the weaknesses of existing national regulations and will 
try to answer the question of how contracting and territorial states can better regulate 
PMCs in contingency operations. For the purpose of this thesis, only three national 
regulations regarding PMCs will be discussed: United States laws, Iraqi Law, and 
Afghanistan Law.  
2. National Laws 
In the United States, there are mainly two domestic laws that can be used to judge 
contractors: MEJA and UCMJ. In the current situation, in accordance with the 
Withdrawal Agreement between the United States and the Iraqi government, Iraq has 
primary jurisdiction over contractors and contractor employees that are working within 
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Iraqi official territory as United States nationals, or third country nationals; however, the 
withdrawal agreement does not encompass persons or entities that normally reside in 
Iraq. On the other hand, Afghanistan theoretically reserves the right to prosecute 
contractors working on behalf of United States; however, in practice, if the personnel of 
PMCs employed by the United States commit crimes in Afghanistan, they are not subject 
to Afghanistan laws but to U.S. prosecution. This implication, similar to what happened 
in Iraq prior to 2009, is the natural outgrowth of institutional weakness of Afghanistan in 
the area of judiciary. Despite mutual agreements between the United States and the 
territorial countries, patches to international laws, and expansion of the UCMJ to cover 
contractors accompanying United States military in Iraq and Afghanistan, some private 
military personnel still remain outside the jurisdiction.356 
a. U.S. Law 
Normally, contractor personnel would be subject to the laws of the 
territorial state. PMCs usually operate in failed states, where justice systems, as any other 
institutions, do not work properly. In such cases, the responsibility falls to the contracting 
state; however, in some cases the application of contracting state laws is also 
problematic, since crimes are committed abroad.357 In order to fulfill its non-transferable 
responsibility of improving the regulation of PMCs, the U.S legislative branch has taken 
many steps to address accountability and transparency problems regarding PMCs in 
contingency operations. Most significantly was the expansion of the UCMJ to encompass 
the staff of PMCs in contingency operations in 2007. In this context, the MEJA and the 
UCMJ seem promising in terms of regulation of PMCs in contingency operations. 
Under the 2007 Defense Authorization Act, Congress expanded the UCMJ 
to cover civilian contractors who are performing tasks in contingency operations, such as 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).358 UCMJ 
Article 2 (a)(10) states that, “In time of declared war or a contingency operation, persons 
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serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field" are subject to UCMJ.359 
United States Code 101 defines “contingency operations as follows: 
 . . . a military operation that-- 
(A) is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which 
members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military 
actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or 
against an opposing military force; or 
(B) results in the call or order to, or retention on, active duty of members 
of the uniformed services under section 688, 12301(a), 12302, 12304, 
12305, or 12406 of this title, chapter 15 of this title, or any other provision 
of law during a war or during a national emergency declared by the 
President or Congress.360 
Previously, civilians could only be prosecuted under the UCMJ in times of 
war. Now they are subject to the UCMJ even during contingency operations. However, 
expansion of the UCMJ has raised many issues; the most critical of which is whether it is 
appropriate to expose civilian contractors to the military justice system. Another issue 
that scholars often raise is whether the U.S. Congress has the authority to order the 
prosecution of civilians under military discipline. If we consider the answers to the 
previous issues as positive, who would be responsible to prosecute them? What will 
happen if the principal deliberately overlooks contractors’ breaching of law? Finally, 
would civilian contractors also be subject to the articles in regard to command structure 
and military honor? Thus, confusion remains.  
MEJA is another regulation that is useful in addressing the problem of 
how to deal with civilians that committed crimes while accompanying military operations 
abroad.361 MEJA covers persons “employed by or accompanying the armed forces” 
overseas.362 In this regard, MEJA covers private military personnel working for the 
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Department of Defense; however, it does not encompass private military personnel 
working for other agencies.363 Persons who are nationals of or habitually residing in the 
host nation are also not covered by MEJA.364 DoD Instruction 5525.11 was issued in 
2005 to implement MEJA outside the United States.365 This instruction obligates the 
DoD Inspector General to notify the Attorney General when DoD personnel commit a 
federal crime overseas.366 Instruction 552511 also requires DoD Inspector General to be 
responsible for conducting investigations to put MEJA into effect.367 Marina Caparini 
states that due to the limitations in MEJA, it can only be exercised only if DoD is the 
employer of the contractor, thus it has rarely been applied to contractors so far.368 
b. Iraqi Law 
According to Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order Number 17, 
issued in 2003, coalition forces were immune from Iraqi prosecution if they committed 
crimes, as long as CPA was in power.369 After the CPA handed over the rule of the 
country to the new Iraqi government in 2004, CPA Order Number 17 remained in place 
for a while. In the current situation, the government of Iraq reserves the authority to 
prosecute the contractors who work for U.S. agencies, the multinational forces and 
diplomatic entities, if they commit crimes in Iraqi official territory.370 A withdrawal 
agreement, which was signed by the U.S. and Iraq on November 17, 2008, provides the  
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Iraqi government with primary jurisdiction over non-Iraqi U.S. Defense contractors and 
their employees who normally reside in Iraq.371 The Agreement defines contractors and 
contractor employees as follows:  
non-Iraqi persons or legal entities, and their employees, who are citizens 
of the United States or a third country and who are in Iraq to supply goods, 
services, and security in Iraq to or on behalf of the United States Forces 
under a contract or subcontract with or for the United States Forces. 
However, the terms do not include persons or legal entities normally 
resident in the territory of Iraq.372 
The withdrawal agreement does not obligate the Iraqi government either to 
negotiate with the United States how cases will be handled, or to notify the U.S. officials 
that a contractor has been taken into custody. Jennifer K. Elsea states that although the 
Withdrawal Agreement does not seem to encompass contractor employees working for 
agencies other than the Department of Defense, citizens of Iraq and persons habitually 
living in Iraq, Iraq has overall exclusive jurisdiction over these personnel, given that 
eventually all of these entities operate under Iraqi laws.373 Conversely, the Withdrawal 
Agreement gives the United States authorization to arrest or detain contractor personnel, 
if they are caught within the boundaries of United States’ bases. Nonetheless, in this case, 
the United States is obliged to notify of the arrest and to hand the captive over to Iraqi 
authorities within 24 hours.374 In other cases, the United States has to get a warrant from 
an Iraqi court in order to arrest or detain a contractor.375 Thus, the Withdrawal 
Agreement provides the government of Iraq with the necessary authorization to arrest or 
detain contractor personnel; however, the application of this agreement still seems 
problematic due largely to weak enforcement mechanisms in Iraq. 
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c. Afghanistan Law 
In Afghanistan, the United States supports two different military 
operations: Operation Enduring Freedom, and The International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF). OEF is a United States-led coalition that embarked on its operations in 
Afghanistan in 2001. Alternatively, ISAF is a NATO-led coalition, which performs its 
mission under UN mandate. Accordingly, personnel of each mission operate under 
different agreements. While United States military and civilian personnel participating in 
OEF are subject to the security agreement between the United States and the Islamic 
Transitional Government of Afghanistan (ITGA), those who are working under ISAF are 
subject to the Military Technical Agreement.  
According to the Military Technical Agreement, ISAF personnel, who are 
deployed under the UN mandate, have immunity from Afghan prosecution, and therefore 
are subject to the jurisdiction of their homeland countries.376 In this respect, currently the 
U.S. has primary jurisdiction over its military and civilian personnel working under 
ISAF.  
Conversely, the United States and ITGA signed a treaty in 2002 
concerning the legal status of U.S. military and civilian personnel that are operating in 
Afghanistan.377 This agreement exempts U.S. military and civilian personnel from 
Afghan prosecution if they commit crimes inside the course of their duties.378 Similar to 
personnel working under ISAF, the United States is the primary authority to execute 
criminal jurisdiction over its own personnel operating under OEF in Afghanistan. The 
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Afghanistan, approved this agreement as well; therefore, the security agreement still 
remains in place.379 Nevertheless, the security agreement does not seem to exempt 
contractor personnel from prosecution.380 
C. OPTIONS FOR REGULATION 
1. International Level 
a. Applying State and Command Responsibility Doctrines 
In “Private Military Companies and International Law: Building New 
Ladders of Legal Accountability and Responsibility,” Maogato and Sheehy propose that 
two well-established doctrines of international law, state responsibility and command 
responsibility, can be used to increase the accountability of PMCs.381 They examine the 
Abu Ghraib case to indicate how these doctrines can help better regulate PMCs, who 
have increasingly been contracted by the United States to implement strategic objectives. 
They conclude that breaches by employees of CACI and Titan Corporation, who were 
hired by United States government through a temporary contract, can be attributed to 
both the United States and the PMCs. While State responsibility doctrine may hold the 
United States responsible as a contracting state, command responsibility doctrine may 
hold not only United States, but also CACI and Titan Corporation responsible, since 
employees committed these crimes under the authority of military commanders via the 
chain of command in the U.S. military, and civilian superiors via chain of command 
within PMC.382 
Normally, states have no responsibility over the activities of non-state 
actors and private persons or firms. International law does not attribute breaches by these 
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entities to states, because these non-state actors and private entities are not directly 
subject to international law. States, on the other hand, are the main subjects of 
international law. International law has created a doctrine over time called “state 
responsibility,” to cover these non-state actors and private entities, which temporarily 
perform delegated functions on behalf of states.383 When these private actors become 
temporary agents of states through a contract, international law conceptualizes these non-
state actors or private entities as “de facto agents” of states.384 If there is some form of 
contract between a state and its temporary agent, state responsibility doctrine connects de 
facto agent’s misconduct or breach of international law to the state that contracted it.385 
Thus, states may be responsible for actions of their de facto agents.386 
Command responsibility doctrine has widely been considered to be unique 
to the military, traditionally perceived as non-transferable responsibilities of commanders 
over crimes and violations of the subordinates under their control. However, today some 
international law specialists claim that in some situations, command responsibility 
doctrine should encompass non-military superiors as well. For example, according to 
Maogato and Sheehy: 
. . . it is clear that under the existing international law doctrine of 
command responsibility, political, paramilitary and bureaucratic superiors 
may be held liable for a failure to control their subordinates . . . Although 
doctrine in various forms has existed for millennia with regard to military 
personnel, it has only recently become a doctrine of international law that 
extends to encompass civilian persons.387 
Article 86 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions make superiors 
responsible for a breach by their subordinates. As paragraph 2 of the article states:  
The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was 
committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or 
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disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or had 
information which should have enabled them to conclude in the 
circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going to commit 
such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within their 
power to prevent or repress the breach.388 
Article 87 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions extends command 
responsibility of commanders to encompass civilians under their control. As paragraph 1 
of the article notes: 
The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall require 
military commanders, with respect to members of the armed forces under 
their command and other persons under their control, to prevent and, 
where necessary, to suppress and to report to competent authorities 
breaches of the Conventions and of this Protocol.389 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentaries on 
additional protocol articulates that command responsibility doctrine must be 
conceptualized in a way that covers both military commanders and civilian superiors, 
stating that “[t]he concept of the superior is broader and should be seen in terms of a 
hierarchy encompassing the concept of control.”390 Therefore, as a matter of international 
law, command responsibility can be applied to superiors of PMCs as well as military 
commanders. 
b. Creating a Registering Entity 
In his thesis, “Regulation of PMCs in Iraq,” Nihat Dumlupinar 
recommends that establishment of an international institution, which is authorized to give 
PMCs official licenses to operate abroad, will facilitate regulation.391 He states that in 
addition to its primary mandate of providing PMCs with formal approval to perform their 
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mission internationally, this institution may keep records of activities of PMCs that are 
registered, providing some form of institutional memory.392 These records would not 
only help states better regulate PMCs, but also force PMCs to respect international norms 
while executing their missions.  
c. Enforcing International Law 
International law holds states responsible for breaches of their de facto 
agents. It mandates that states have non-transferable responsibilities such as taking the 
precautions in their power to prevent breaches by their de facto agents and punishing 
perpetrators. International law obligates states to make amendments to their existing 
regulations to facilitate prosecution, extend their jurisdictions to cover the personnel of 
their de facto agents operating overseas, establish effective oversight mechanisms to 
prevent abuses by them, and enforce laws immediately to deter potential misconduct or 
non-compliance with international norms. If they cannot punish perpetrators through their 
domestic laws, international law requires that they submit them to the International 
Criminal Court.   
Any law that lacks a properly working enforcement mechanism is doomed 
to be breached. International law is no exception. Most of the challenges regarding 
international regulation can be attributed to the dysfunctional enforcement mechanism. 
Since there is no overarching authority to impose sanctions on PMCs and their personnel 
when necessary, PMCs often take advantage of this power vacuum to get unfair leverage 
over states, and sometimes breach international laws without any concern. PMCs also 
appropriate the impotence of failed states, where institutions are relatively weak, and 
where the very governance itself is problematic. In this regard, properly working 
international law with an effective enforcement mechanism is critical for these states to 
protect themselves from the potential hazards of careless utilization of PMCs by other 
states on their sovereignty.  
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2. National Level 
States are not autonomous entities. Rather, they are composed of individuals, 
groups, and institutions with their own interests. These entities seek to influence state 
behavior according to their own driving incentives. Therefore, it is pretty difficult for 
these entities to reach a consensus. For this reason, even the most organized and capable 
states, like the United States, sometimes face challenges in taking corrective action. On 
the other hand, it is much more difficult for weak and failed states, such as Iraq and 
Afghanistan, to conciliate these distinct interests and reach an agreement.   
a. The United States 
Of these three countries, the United States is the most capable and most 
successful in terms of domestic regulation. Most of the good practices written in the 
Montreux Document are taken from the experiences of the United States in contingency 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite some shortcomings and small defects, the 
United States has one of the most comprehensive regulatory frameworks with respect to 
PMCs. In the last few years, the United States Congress has adopted various measures to 
improve institutional oversight over the PMCs. The United States Congress expanded and 
clarified jurisdiction over crimes committed by private military personnel overseas. To 
some extent, these measures improved the regulatory framework in the United States; 
however, it appears that much remains to be done to make sure that offences by private 
military personnel do not go unpunished.    
In the United States, there are many good practices with respect to 
utilization of PMCs. For instance, federal agencies generally repeat their contracts with 
cost-efficient and reputable PMCs, while staying away from PMCs that seek high value, 
high-risk, and single-shot contracts. In order to prevent information asymmetry in 
contingency operations, the United States also uses “fire-alarming” to get feedback about 
breaches and violations of PMCs that it contracted with, using the media, local people, 
local security forces, and NGOs that simultaneously use the same territory with PMCs. 
Fire-alarming creates an additional pressure on PMCs, obligating them to be careful not 
to undermine their reputation by poorly or inappropriately performing their functions. It 
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helps strengthen existing monitoring mechanisms, deterring PMCs from breaching 
international humanitarian law. Thus, fire-alarming systems facilitate regulation by 
encouraging PMCs to “self-report” their own actions. The United States also has 
effective institutional monitoring mechanisms, such as, GAO, CRS, SIGIR and SIGAR. 
These mechanisms provide the United States government and Congress vital information 
regarding PMCs. The United States also uses institutional checks like “judicial review” in 
order to control PMCs.  
Nevertheless there are weaknesses in the existing regulations as well. 
Although the United States extended the UCMJ to encompass civilians who accompany 
United States military in contingency operations in 2007, some personnel still remain 
outside the jurisdiction and largely due to political unwillingness. The United States 
sometimes fails to enforce existing domestic laws and impose sanctions on PMCs when 
necessary. The United States has the most comprehensive regulation system with respect 
to PMCs; however, it can more effectively regulate the private military industry.  
The first step for the United States must be to create a comprehensive 
doctrine that recognizes the significance of the presence of PMCs in contingency 
operations. Evaluating whether existing regulations are adequate for exerting control over 
PMCs in contingency operations and authorizing the legislative branch to take steps to 
improve domestic regulation to cover private military personnel remaining outside of the 
jurisdiction, the United States can better regulate PMCs. In doing that, the United States 
legislative branch can take the judiciary’s concerns and proposals into account.    
Second, abstaining from outsourcing inherently governmental functions to 
PMCs, the United States can better protect its national interests abroad. Contracting out 
certain tasks, during the execution of which employees of PMCs are likely to use force, 
runs the risk of undermining the efforts of the United States in contingency operations.  
Third, the United States can go on to promote the current licensing system 
to indirectly control the activities of PMCs that are registered in the United States but 
operate abroad. While providing PMCs with relevant licenses and authorizations, taking  
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the criminal records and past performances of PMCs into consideration may be useful for 
the United States to exert better control over PMCs. In this regard, improving SPOT is 
essential to increasing the accountability of PMCs.  
b. Iraq and Afghanistan 
Territorial states have also obligations regarding regulating PMCs in terms 
of international law. The Montreux Document states that territorial states should assess 
whether the internal legal framework is adequate to properly regulate PMCs that operate 
within their territories or whether it needs adaptations or amendments.393 Iraq and 
Afghanistan face many challenges with regard to enforcing existing laws. Moreover, 
creating and enforcing additional laws may seem too difficult for these new governments. 
Although Both Iraq and Afghanistan have primary jurisdiction over the activities of 
PMCs within their territories, they lack mechanisms to punish perpetrators.394 
Democratic institutions in those countries are relatively new and weak, so it is pretty 
problematic for these countries to properly regulate PMCs alone. The Withdrawal 
Agreement provides the Iraqi government with the necessary authorizations to prosecute 
private military personnel.395 Nonetheless, the application of this agreement still seems 
problematic, due largely to weak enforcement mechanisms in Iraq. In Afghanistan, the 
Military Technical Agreement provides the United States with the primary jurisdiction 
over its private military personnel who are deployed as ISAF personnel under the UN 
mandate.396 Nominally, the government of Afghanistan has the primary authority to carry 
out criminal jurisdiction over private military personnel operating on behalf of the United 
States government under OEF, but in practice the only capable entity in the country that 
can prosecute the staff of PMCs is the United States. The Montreux Document 
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acknowledges these challenges and recommends territorial states to cooperate with the 
contracting state to better regulate PMCs operating in their territories.397  
In this regard, in order to better regulate PMCs within their own territories, 
Iraq and Afghanistan may require PMCs to obtain official license or authorization from 
both their homeland governments and territorial state governments.398 Criteria for official 
license may require PMCs to have sufficient economic and financial capacity with clear 
personnel and property records, and to employ well-trained personnel who have clear 
records. Territorial states must be careful about not to grant license to PMCs that 
acquired weapons illegally. The Montreux Document recommends territorial states that 
they should ensure that PMCs meet the following criteria, before getting relevant licenses 
and authorizations: 
a) no reliably attested record of involvement in serious crime (including 
organized crime, violent crime, sexual offences, violations of international 
humanitarian law, bribery and corruption) and, insofar as the PMSC or its 
personnel had engaged in past unlawful conduct, has appropriately dealt 
with such conduct, including by effectively cooperating with official 
authorities, taking disciplinary measures against those involved, and where 
appropriate and consistent with findings of wrongdoing, providing 
individuals injured by their conduct with appropriate reparation; 
b) conducted comprehensive inquiries within applicable law regarding the 
extent to which any of its personnel, particularly those who are required to 
carry weapons as part of their duties, have a reliably attested record of not 
having been involved in serious crime or have not been dishonorably 
discharged from armed or security forces; 
c) not previously had an operating license revoked for misconduct of the 
PMSC or its personnel.399  
While granting official licenses and authorizations, territorial states may 
require PMCs to train their personnel sufficiently, implementing both pre-deployment 
training and ongoing training. They may also obligate PMCs and their subcontractors to 
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work in harmony with domestic and international law.400 Moreover, they can establish 
oversight mechanism to monitor their activities, taking all precautions within their power 
to enforce it. 







                                                 
400 See the Montreux Document, 22. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis sought to analyze the issues concerning how to outsource, monitor, 
manage and regulate PMCs that have become an indispensible part of contingency 
operations, so that they can be properly utilized to fulfill United States’ policy objectives 
overseas. In this respect, utilization of PMCs by United States governmental agencies 
was examined in two different contingency operations: Operation Iraqi Freedom and 
Operation Enduring Freedom. This thesis studied these cases for two reasons. First, the 
United States government, which is a prominent customer of the private military industry, 
stands out as a unique example in terms of utilization of PMCs in contingency operations 
because it has a relatively long tradition of and much experience in outsourcing PMCs. 
Second; Iraq and Afghanistan have become test areas with respect to the utilization of 
PMCs by governmental agencies to implement various contingency functions on behalf 
of the United States government. In this context, this conclusion will recap the arguments 
made in the previous chapters and provide overall considerations of how governmental 
agencies of the United States can better outsource, monitor, manage and regulate PMCs 
in contingency operations.  
A. HOW TO BETTER OUTSOURCE PMCS 
The second chapter examined two primary factors that affect make-or-buy 
decisions of governmental agencies: transaction cost economics and inherently 
governmental functions. TCE was emphasized to better understand how transaction costs 
influence make-or-buy decisions of governmental agencies. This chapter argued that 
outsourcing has pushed both governmental agencies, which were formerly pure 
hierarchies, and PMCs, which previously only operated under market conditions, to adopt 
institutional structures of hybrid type of organizations. So, while governmental agencies 
have compromised some level of control and coordination in return for greater efficiency, 
PMCs have compromised some level of autonomy in exchange for the opportunities that 
the government agencies of the United States provided via contingency contracting. It 
was concluded that governmental agencies would be more likely to contract out a 
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particular function if this function does not reflect its core competency, if it does not rely 
on a highly specific asset, if uncertainty is low and if monitoring is easier. Otherwise, 
governmental agencies would more likely to keep the same function in-house, 
economizing on transaction costs. 
The second chapter also analyzed inherently governmental functions to show how 
they affect make-or-buy decisions of governmental agencies. It was pointed out that 
inherently governmental functions aim to restrict governmental agencies from contracting 
out core or sovereign functions. It was demonstrated that hierarchies are better at 
protecting specific assets and carrying out sovereign functions that require considerable 
probity than are hybrids and markets. Therefore, this chapter recommended that it would 
be better for governmental agencies in the United States to not contract out inherently 
governmental functions in contingency operations, even if outsourcing them is more cost-
efficient than keeping them in-house. It was noted that the application of this 
recommendation is, however, quite challenging, since there is no consensus on what 
those functions are. 
Furthermore, TCE set forth three primary contractual hazards: asset specificity 
hazard, uncertainty hazard, and probity hazard. It was discussed that since some PMCs 
supply highly specific assets like sophisticated weapon systems and specialized human 
capital, they might pose serious dangers to the governmental agencies that depend on 
them. It was also argued that contracting with PMCs in contingency operations runs the 
risk of undermining the efforts of governmental agencies. Furthermore, it was 
emphasized that monitoring becomes harder in contingency operations for two reasons: 
because uncertainty is high and because PMCs have often incentives to hide information 
when they perform their missions geographically far from their principles. Finally, it was 
highlighted that probity hazard is also likely in contracts with PMCs in contingency 
operations because, unlike militaries, private security is not a profession. It was 
concluded that therefore, without effective monitoring and punishing mechanisms, abuses 
by PMCs cannot be prevented. 
Finally, the second chapter asserted that outsourcing is a two-edged sword. 
Outsourcing some tasks to PMCs only when necessary may sometimes be cost-efficient  
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on the part of governmental agencies. Nonetheless, it may also be costly to utilize PMCs 
in contingency operations, especially when there are no effective monitoring mechanisms 
to supervise their activities.   
B. HOW TO BETTER MONITOR AND MANAGE PMCS 
 The third chapter sought to answer the question of how the United States might 
use oversight mechanisms to better manage PMCs in contingency operations. It was 
discussed that unless effective contract management and oversight mechanisms are 
established, costs might increase due to waste, corruption, and abuse. The third chapter 
revealed the dearth of required capacity in the United States to monitor PMCs, and the 
absence of commitment to supervise and manage contracts have played a key role in 
financial and conduct related abuses in Iraq and Afghanistan. New Institutionalism and 
Principal-Agent Theory provided the theoretical basis for this chapter. With respect to 
utilization of PMCs by governmental agencies in contingency operations, six major 
institutional problems were diagnosed. These institutional problems can be summarized 
as follows: doctrinal void and institutional misunderstanding of the roles that PMCs play 
in contingency operations, weaknesses in interagency coordination, shortage of 
contracting professionals, inadequate training of COs and CORs, unclear contracting 
requirements and immeasurable standards, and inadequate training of military 
commanders and personnel. In response to these six major institutional challenges, the 
third chapter proposed seven steps with regard to improving monitoring and managing of 
PMCs in contingency operations.  
 First, the development of a new doctrine that reflects organizational 
understanding of the roles that PMCs play in contingency operations is essential. This 
new doctrine must answer to the actual needs of contingency operations. The importance 
of writing a living doctrine that can answer to the actual needs of contracting in 
contingency operations was highlighted. It is argued that doctrines do very little if 
members of institutions do not apply these principles in their daily tasks. Second, 
improving the existing SPOT system is vital because without accurate data, governmental 
agencies cannot outsource, supervise and manage PMCs. Third, creating an open, 
transparent and competitive market is crucial, because PMCs can easily overcharge their 
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governmental agencies if there is no competitive market discipline. Markets can regulate 
PMCs, but only if they are open, transparent, and competitive. Fourth, strengthening 
interagency coordination mechanisms is critical. Governmental agencies that use PMC in 
contingency operations must not only coordinate with each other, but must also 
coordinate with other regional and international organizations and the governmental 
agencies of the territorial states that contract with PMCs. Better coordination would 
likely bring about greater efficiency and control, as well as less fraud, waste and abuse. 
Fifth, increasing the quality and quantity of contracting professionals is important 
because a greater number of contracting professionals with better training would 
presumably lead to better monitoring and contract management on the part of 
governmental agencies and less financial and conduct related abuses on the part of PMCs. 
Sixth, training military personnel and clarifying authorities are imperative. The third 
chapter discusses in detail that commanders on the battlefield often have no idea about 
whether and how they can manage PMCs. Much of this confusion derives from 
insufficient pre-deployment and ongoing training, and intricate lines of authority over 
PMCs. Elimination of this complication would predictably increase control over PMCs. 
Seventh, continuing to use a licensing system as an effective indirect mechanism to 
compel PMCs to respect international norms and standards is cardinal. In this respect, 
this chapter recommends the United States monitor PMCs that are registered in the 
United States but operate in Iraq and Afghanistan, even if they work independently from 
the United States government, that the U.S. cancel the licenses of those whose 
misconduct is proven. 
C. HOW TO BETTER REGULATE PMCS 
In the fourth chapter, major challenges regarding the regulation of PMCs in 
contingency operations were reviewed to demonstrate how the current regulatory 
framework exempts some of the staff of PMCs from prosecution in Iraq and in 
Afghanistan. It was discussed that PMCs may undermine stabilization and reconstruction 
efforts when they are not regulated properly.  
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This chapter argued that even though there are international laws that seek to 
regulate PMCs, they do not define the current activities and roles of PMCs in 
contingency operations. Furthermore, the fourth chapter put forth that international law 
lacks enforcement mechanisms to prosecute offences by private military personnel, so 
cannot properly regulate PMCs in contingency operations alone. It was highlighted that 
domestic laws, not only in the United States but also in Iraq and Afghanistan, are unable 
to regulate PMCs effectively, either because of insufficient capacity or because of 
political unwillingness. Thus, chapter four maintained that enforcement problem of the 
international law, insufficient capacity of Iraq and Afghanistan, and political 
unwillingness of the United States, provided PMCs with considerable flexibilities in 
terms of their legal obligations and practices in contingency operations. 
It was also discussed in the fourth chapter that the complexity of prosecuting 
private military personnel operating in contingency operations is due largely to their 
vague legal status under international law. It was clarified that even though PMCs 
themselves do not have a status under international humanitarian law, their employees do. 
It was stated that the status of the staff of PMCs, however, is contingent on the nature of 
their contract and the nature of functions they perform, so must be determined on a case-
by-case basis. The fourth chapter proposed that as a matter of international law, state 
responsibility and command responsibility doctrines can be applied to PMCs as well as 
states to increase the accountability of PMCs in contingency operations. In addition, it 
was recommended that the establishment of an international institution that is authorized 
to give PMCs official licenses to operate abroad would facilitate regulation. Finally, it 
was noted that this institution may keep records of PMCs, providing governmental 
agencies with vital institutional memory and pushing PMCs to respect international 
norms while executing their missions.  
The fourth chapter also argued that states are not autonomous entities, but are 
made up of individuals, groups, and institutions that seek to influence the state behavior 
in accordance with their distinct motives and interests. It was claimed that reaching a 
consensus to take corrective action is therefore a big challenge, even for well-organized 
and capable states. In this regard, the fourth chapter suggested that the United States, 
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Iraq, and Afghanistan use the Montreux Document as a guide to better regulate PMCs in 
contingency operations. It was emphasized that cooperation between these states is 
essential for a more effective regulation. Finally, it was recommended that keeping their 
non-transferable responsibilities under international law, these states should take all 
measures in their power to implement as many best practices written in the document as 
possible to exert better control over PMCs in contingency operations. 
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